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From Sex for Pleasure to Sex for Parenthood: How
the Law Manufactures Mothers
Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid*
As soon as sperm enter a woman, so do law and politics—or so the decades-long disputes
surrounding abortion suggest. Now, however, renewed debates regarding contraceptives
indicate that legal and political interference with women’s sexual and reproductive
autonomy may actually precede the sperm. This Article argues that women even thinking
about having sex are increasingly defined socially and legally as “mothers.” Via this broad
definition of who is a “mother,” the State extends its reach into women’s decisionmaking
throughout their reproductive lifetimes.
This Article argues that the State simultaneously devalues women’s choices to have sex for
pleasure, which this Article calls “desexualization,” and uses medical rituals associated
with motherhood, which this Article calls “ritualization,” to persuade women to accept the
role of mother. Desexualization and ritualization signal the State’s attempt to influence
women’s sexual and reproductive decisionmaking not only in the context of abortion, but
also in the areas of contraception, pregnancy, and childbirth.
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Introduction
1

“‘[B]eing against sex is not good. . . . Sex is popular.’”

Sex is complicated. It can be physical, emotional, violent, tender, for
pleasure or for procreation, and any combination of these.2 Arguably, no other
act can have so many different meanings and consequences, pregnancy
included. But two things are certain: sex is popular, and women, specifically,
are sexual beings.3 Perhaps due to its near-universal appeal, sex is also a
frequent subject of legal regulation.4 Today, women are regulated—not as
sexual beings but as would-be mothers—long before they ever have sex and
certainly before they see a fetal image on an ultrasound screen, whether before
an abortion or as a milestone on a path to childbirth.5
For women, “[s]ex for pleasure, for fun, or even for building relationships
is completely absent from our national conversation.”6 Instead, the national
focus is on “morality,” a one-word descriptor for the anxiety that female

1. Maureen Dowd, Ghastly Outdated Party, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/02/26/opinion/sunday/dowd-ghastly-outdated-party.html (quoting Republican strategist Alex Castellanos).
Sex may be procreative or not or to achieve intimacy or not. See generally Laura A. Rosenbury & Jennifer E.
Rothman, Sex In and Out of Intimacy, 59 Emory L.J. 809 (2010). “Sex” in this Article refers to consensual,
potentially procreative intercourse. See Krisztina Morvai, What is Missing from the Rhetoric of Choice? A
Feminist Analysis of the Abortion Dilemma in the Context of Sexuality, 5 UCLA Women’s L.J. 445, 460 (1995).
“Pleasure,” as used in this Article, is a positive “feeling, a sensation, a subjectively experienced phenomenon”
stemming from sex. See Paul R. Abramson & Steven D. Pinkerton, With Pleasure: Thoughts on the Nature of
Human Sexuality 45 (1995).
2. Sylvia A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 187, 225; see
Margo Kaplan, Sex-Positive Law, 89 N.Y.U. L. Rev. (forthcoming Apr. 2014) (arguing that “sexual pleasure
has value because of the pleasure it provides and apart from its ability to serve other ends such as emotional
bonding or procreation”). Sex for pleasure and sex for procreation are not necessarily disaggregated, though in
this Article the intent of sex for pleasure is pleasure itself, not procreation.
3. See Debby Herbenick et al., Sexual Behavior in the United States: Results from a National
Probability Sample of Men and Women Ages 14–94, 7 J. Sexual Med. 255, 262 (2010) (detailing women’s
varied sexual activities). Anti-abortion-rights advocates may be portrayed as being “anti-sex.” See Kristin
Luker, Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood 210 (1984) (noting that people who are anti-abortion rights
“value sex, of course, but they value it for its traditional benefits (babies)” rather than for intimacy).
4. Andrea Dworkin, Intercourse 185 (1987). For examples of social and legal regulation, see Elizabeth
Bernstein & Laurie Schaffner, Regulating Sex: The Politics of Intimacy and Identity (2005); John D’Emilio &
Estelle B. Freedman, Intimate Matters: A History of Sexuality in America (2012).
5. See infra Part III; see also Beth Burkstrand-Reid, The War on Sex for Pleasure, Huffington Post
(May
16,
2012,
1:58 PM),
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/beth-burkstrandreid/war-onwomen_b_1521804.html (arguing that the “war on sex” targets both women and sex itself).
6. Jessica Valenti, The Purity Myth: How America’s Obsession with Virginity is Hurting Young
Women 43 (2009) [hereinafter Valenti, Purity Myth]. Strikingly, sex and sexuality are often not associated
with motherhood. Beth Montemurro & Jenna Marie Siefken, MILFS and Matrons: Images and Realities of
Mothers’ Sexuality, 16 Sexuality & Culture 366, 367 (2012); Rebecca W. Tardy, “But I Am a Good Mom”:
The Social Construction of Motherhood Through Health-Care Conversations, 29 J. Contemp. Ethnography
433, 462–63 (2000). Women’s sexuality is culturally constructed and influenced by male dominance.
Catharine A. MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law 53 (1987).
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sexuality provokes in the collective consciousness.7 Increasingly, the State is
the moral arbitrator of women’s sexual choices.
While the dialogue on sexual activity has long focused on abortion,8 more
recent controversies have involved non-abortion reproductive health issues,
such as contraception.9 These debates boil down to one question about every
woman: when she has sex, is she acting as a “slut,” by having sex for pleasure,
or as a “mother,” by having sex for procreation?10 The answer to this question
has profound legal consequences for contraception policy, abortion rights, and
even medical care during pregnancy.11 This Article argues that for women
today, there is no such thing as sex for pleasure under the law: only sex for the
purpose of becoming a mother is considered legitimate, and women’s sexual
and reproductive health choices are regulated accordingly.12
So if you are a woman, are you a “slut” or a “mother”? Given that nearly
all women use contraception during their lifetime, there are a lot of “sluts”—
women having sex without intending to procreate—out there.13 This Article
argues that the law regulates women’s reproductive choices by reconceptualizing all sexually active (or potentially sexually active) women as

7. Carol Groneman, Nymphomania: A History xvii (2000); Marty Klein, America’s War on Sex: The
Attack on Law, Lust and Liberty 2 (2006); Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 1, 2 (2005).
8. State Policy Trends: Abortion and Contraception in the Crosshairs, Guttmacher Inst. (Apr. 13,
2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/04/13/index.html (“In the first three months of 2012,
legislators in 45 of the 46 legislatures that have convened this year introduced 944 provisions related to
reproductive health and rights. Half of these provisions would restrict abortion access.”).
9. Richard Wolf & Cathy Lynn Grossman, Obama Mandate on Birth Control Coverage Stirs
Controversy, USA Today (Feb. 9, 2012), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-0208/catholics-contraceptive-mandate/53014864/1.
10. “Slut” is used in this Article because of its use in the Sandra Fluke controversy. See Julie Rovner, Law
Student Makes Case for Contraceptive Coverage, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Feb. 23 2012, 4:39 PM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/health/2012/02/23/147299323/law-student-makes-case-for-contraceptive-coverage.
“Slut” is defined by Merriam-Webster Dictionary as “a promiscuous woman; especially: PROSTITUTE.” Slut
Definition, Merriam-Webster.com, http://www.merriam-webster.com/ dictionary/slut (last visited Oct. 6, 2013);
see Leora Tanenbaum, Slut!: Growing Up Female with a Bad Reputation 11 (1999) (arguing that “slut-bashing” is
about more than sex—it reflects a girl’s failure to behave according to social dictates). This Article adopts the
Oxford Dictionary’s definition that motherhood occurs after birth. Mother Definition, OxfordDictionaries.com,
http://oxforddictionaries.com/us/definition/american_english/mother (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (“[A] woman in
relation to a child or children to whom she has given birth.”). This Article also acknowledges both the physical and
social burdens of motherhood. Jennifer S. Hendricks, Body and Soul: Equality, Pregnancy, and the Unitary Right
to Abortion, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 329, 340–41 (2010).
11. See infra Parts II, III.
12. Robert D. Goldstein, Mother-Love and Abortion: A Legal Interpretation 13–16 (1988). This is not to
say that puritanical notions of sexuality are new. See generally Gail Collins, America’s Women: Four
HundredYears of Dolls, Drudges, Helpmates, and Heroines (2003) (discussing the history of women, including
women and sex).
13. Ninety-nine percent of women fifteen to forty-four years of age who have had intercourse have used
contraception. William D. Mosher & Jo Jones, Ctrs. for Disease Control & Prevention, Use of Contraception
in the United States: 1982–2008, at 5 (Aug. 2010).
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mothers.14 Motherhood is not just a biological status; it is a socially
constructed role with built-in behavioral expectations—including some
surrounding sexuality—that are imposed on women.15
In the context of abortion care, the State’s use of the law to regulate
women’s reproductive choices is clear—focusing solely on abortion is a
reductionist view of women, their health, and the State’s role in women’s
lives.16 By broadly defining “mother” to include all women of reproductive
age, the State is able to extend its reach over women’s reproductive lives and
autonomous decisionmaking.17 Moreover, when a woman is pregnant, the State
can assert its authority to prohibit abortion or use its power to regulate the
choices of the “mother” in order to protect the fetus.18 These are but examples;
the State regulates a woman’s entire reproductive lifetime, not simply specific
points within it. This blinds us to opportunities to improve women’s health
holistically and reduces women’s autonomy.
This Article argues that the law effectively re-characterizes women as
mothers by (1) desexualizing women, or advancing the notion that women
should only have sex for procreation,19 and (2) ritualizing women’s healthcare
by viewing and treating women (pregnant or not) as “pre-mothers,” and using
the law to impose medical and social practices associated with “good mothers”
upon them.20 The law embodies both desexualization and ritualization in many
aspects of the regulation of women’s sexuality. The presence of
desexualization and ritualization in law and policy serves as a warning that the
State is reaching into women’s health-related decisionmaking. This Article
further argues that desexualization and ritualization can be mobilized as legal

14. Cynthia R. Daniels, At Women’s Expense: State Power and the Politics of Fetal Rights 26 (1993)
(“In this legal and political discourse, women’s autonomy is traded against (and often traded away) by
women’s right to reproductive choice.”). In the case of women who are already parenting, they are recharacterized as “mothers” of additional children-to-be, regardless of whether future pregnancy or parenting is
desired. These women can still be “sluts” if they have sex for pleasure instead of sex for further procreation.
15. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Beyond “A Woman’s Right to Choose”: Feminist Ideas About Reproductive
Rights, in The Reproductive Rights Reader: Law, Medicine, and the Construction of Motherhood 107 (Nancy
Ehrenreich ed., 2008) (“[W]oman’s reproductive situation is never the result of biology alone, but of biology mediated
by social and cultural organization.”); see Elisabeth Badinter, The Conflict: How Modern Motherhood Undermines
the Status of Women 12–14 (2010); Jessica Valenti, Why Have Kids?: A New Mom Explores the Truth About
Parenting and Happiness 4 (2012) [hereinafter Why Have Kids?]; Jessica Valenti, He’s a Stud, She’s A Slut And 49
Other Double Standards Every Woman Should Know 118–21 (2008); M. M. Slaughter, The Legal Construction of
“Mother”, in Mothers in Law: Feminist Theory and the Legal Regulation of Motherhood 73 (Martha Albertson
Fineman & Isabel Karpin eds., 1995). There are many types of mothers, mothering, and motherhood. See Carol
Sanger, M is for the Many Things, 1 S. Cal. Rev. L. & Women’s Stud. 15, 31–32 (1992).
16. Lynn M. Paltrow, Abortion Issue Divides, Distracts Us from Common Threats and Threads, A.B.A:
Persps., Winter 2005.
17. See infra Part II.
18. See infra Parts II, III.
19. For many, this means having sex within marriage, even if that is not the case in practice. Richard A.
Posner, Sex and Reason 243 (1992).
20. Kimberly M. Mutcherson, Making Mommies: Law, Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, and the
Complications of Pre-Motherhood, 18 Colum. J. Gender & L. 313, 337 (2008).
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tools used to transform women into “mothers,” thus making their
decisionmaking and their bodies fair game for regulation.
Part I of this Article examines the legal transformation of women into
mothers by analyzing the conversion of “women’s health” to “maternal health”
in abortion jurisprudence. Subpart A briefly examines the conceptualization of
health generally, women’s health, and maternal health. It further details
problems posed by the use of “maternal health” in the law as a descriptor for
health issues faced by pregnant women. Subpart B argues that abortion
jurisprudence is the exemplar for how the law co-opts women’s health and thus
transforms even non-pregnant women into mothers.
Part II argues that in both the abortion context and beyond, sexual and
reproductive health laws desexualize women, re-characterizing women’s desire
to have sex for pleasure as an act of procreation instead, thus facilitating
regulation of women’s health far beyond abortion. Subpart A defines
desexualization as advancing the notion that women should only have sex for
procreation, and examines its development in the law. Subpart B argues that
desexualization begins before sex, through stigmatization of sexually active
women, as the debate around the Affordable Care Act (“ACA”)—otherwise
known as Obamacare—exemplifies. Subpart C uses the emergency
contraception controversy to illustrate that once a woman has sex, she is
assumed to have consented to the role of “mother,” thus allowing the woman
to be legally treated as a mother and her health treated as “maternal health.”
Part III discusses the impact of ritualization in reproductive health law.
Specifically, Part III focuses on how ritualization, in combination with
desexualization, is mobilized in an attempt to control women’s reproductive
decisionmaking. Subpart A defines ritualization as the use of medical
experiences related to pregnancy and childbirth to influence the sexual and
reproductive decisionmaking of women. Abortion laws mimic the rituals of
obstetrical care, for example, as a way of pushing women toward motherhood.
Subpart B examines how this ritualization occurs outside of the abortion
context, specifically during a continuing pregnancy, an area subject to
extensive—but under-examined—legal regulation.
Finally, Part IV theorizes that future laws will employ ritualization and
desexualization to reduce women’s reproductive autonomy.21 Subpart A
discusses the current use of desexualization and ritualization in current
controversies in contraception regulation and abortion legislation. Subpart B

21. See generally Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Code of Perfect Pregnancy: At the Intersection of the Ideology of
Motherhood, the Practice of Defaulting to Science, and the Interventionist Mindset of Law, 53 Ohio St. L.J.
1205, 1207 (1992) [hereinafter Ikemoto, Code of Perfect Pregnancy] (“However, there is outstanding the idea
and practice of controlling women with regard to conception, gestation, and childbirth in ways that express
dominant cultural notions of motherhood.”); Pamela Laufer-Ukeles, Reproductive Choices and Informed
Consent: Fetal Interests, Women’s Identity, and Relational Autonomy, 37 Am. J.L. & Med. 567, 568–69
(2011) (discussing how lawmakers and the public are “obsessed” with reproduction). This Article focuses on
how potentially procreative sex is regulated. Procreative sex is but one form of sexual expression.
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hypothesizes how future regulation of contraceptives may rest on
desexualization and ritualization.
At its core, this Article theorizes that the law re-conceptualizes sexually
active women, pushing them toward the role of a lifetime: motherhood.22 After
all, using contraceptives, for example, is “a license to do things in a sexual
realm that is counter to how things are supposed to be.”23 When women resist
the role of mother, they face marginalization and stigmatization—and, in some
cases, legal control of their decisionmaking.

I. Women’s Health Is Dead. Long Live Maternal Health
In 2006, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”)
recommended that all women of childbearing age take vitamins, abstain from
certain behaviors such as smoking and heavy drinking, and monitor their
weight, all to prepare for eventual motherhood.24 In essence, the government
indicated that it viewed women as mothers-to-be.25 Women are transformed
into mothers via government actions that are ostensibly designed to protect
women’s health. We see this in regulatory contexts such as the CDC
recommendations, as well as via various statutes and court decisions: the
underlying questions are whose health is most important—the pregnant
woman’s or the fetus’—and who gets to make that determination.26
A. From Woman to Mother, Women’s Health to Maternal Health
Abortion jurisprudence provides the quintessential example of the legal
conceptualization of women as mothers.27 We see this directly in Supreme
Court rhetoric, which emphasizes “maternal” health despite the fact that not all
sexually active women are mothers and not all women want to be mothers.28

22. Turning women into “mothers” in the law via desexualization and ritualization may be intentional or
an unintended result of broader social and legal policies.
23. Charles P. Pierce, Santorum’s War Against Women, Continued, Esquire (Jan. 3, 2012, 3:41 PM),
http://www.esquire.com/blogs/politics/rick-santorum-contraception-6632083 (quoting Rick Santorum); see
John Bancroft, Editorial: The Pill, Sex, and the Politics of Gender, Medical Aspects of Human Sexuality (Mar.
2002) (“The idea that [the pill] might allow unmarried women to enjoy sex free of fears of pregnancy was
anathema to many physicians, and concern that it might ‘let loose’ the sexuality of married women was not far
below the surface.”) (on file with Author).
24. Why Have Kids?, supra note 15, at 3–4.
25. Id.; see Rebecca Kukla, Measuring Mothering, 1 Int’l J. Feminist Approaches to Bioethics 67, 69
(2008); Jessica Valenti, Full Frontal Feminism 154–55 (2007).
26. Margo Kaplan, “A Special Class of Persons”: Pregnant Women’s Right to Refuse Medical Treatment
After Gonzales v. Carhart, 13 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 145, 203 (2010).
27. Luker, supra note 3, at 193 (“[T]he abortion debate is so passionate and hard-fought because it is a
referendum on the place and meaning of motherhood.”).
28. Elizabeth A. Reilly, The Rhetoric of Disrespect: Uncovering the Faulty Premises Infecting
Reproductive Rights, 5 Am. U. J. Gender & L. 147, 157–58 (1996) (“[T]he United States Supreme Court has
consistently viewed women through their reproductive capacity. Women have been subsumed into their
reproductive organs. The woman as an independent person with interests and needs is invisible in the Court’s
decisions: instead, law has treated women first and foremost as potential or actual mothers.”).

5. Burkstrand-Reid_28 (Do Not Delete) -- – DRAFT: DO NOT CITE

218

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/1/2013 11:33 AM

[Vol. 65:211

To understand the differences between health, women’s health, and
maternal health, one may visualize a funnel. At the top of the funnel is the
broadest category of “health,” a non-sex-specific term referring to “a state of
complete physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of
disease or infirmity.”29 Further into the narrowing funnel, we reach “women’s
health,” which includes sex-specific health issues faced by women in their
lifetime, including but not limited to concerns based on women’s unique
sexual and reproductive capacity.30 Below women’s health is an even smaller
subset of women’s health—some call it “maternal health”—which specifically
relates to pregnancy, birth, and post-partum care.31 Only some women
experience these health issues. Almost one in five women end their
reproductive years without having a child, double the percentage in the
1970s.32
When used in a legal context, the descriptor “maternal health” is often
coupled with use of the term “mother” to refer to pregnant women.33 When
these terms are used together, the woman’s health is no longer her own, but is
tied up with the demands of motherhood even prior to childbirth. Thus, judicial
use of the term “maternal health” when discussing pregnancy and childbirth is
particularly problematic. Women’s health is often reduced to maternal health, a
transformation with significant implications.34 Motherhood, after all, is not just
a physical condition; it is also a social role.35 In other words, legal protections
of maternal health are not just a means to keeping women healthy; they propel
women toward accepting a mothering role. This role requires a woman to

29. World Health Org. [WHO], WHO Definition of Health, http://www.who.int/about/
definition/en/print.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). Within its general “health” definition, the WHO includes the
non-sex-specific concept of “reproductive health,” which concerns the functioning of “reproductive processes,
functions and system at all stages of life. Reproductive health, therefore, implies that people are able to have a
responsible, satisfying and safe sex life and that they have the capability to reproduce and the freedom to decide if,
when
and
how
often
to
do
so.”
WHO,
Health
Topics:
Reproductive
Health,
http://www.who.int/topics/reproductive_health/en (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
30. See U.S. Nat’l Library of Med., Nat’l Insts. of Health, Women’s Health,
http://www.nlm.nih.gov/medlineplus/womenshealth.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013) (“Women have unique
health issues. And some of the health issues that affect both men and women can affect women differently.
Unique issues include pregnancy, menopause, and conditions of the female organs. Women can have a healthy
pregnancy by getting early and regular prenatal care. They should also get recommended breast cancer,
cervical cancer, and bone density screenings. Women and men also have many of the same health problems.
But these problems can affect women differently.”).
31. See, e.g., WHO, Health Topics: Maternal Health, http://www.who.int/topics/maternal_health/en (last
visited Oct. 8, 2013).
32. Gretchen Livingston & D’Vera Cohn, Childlessness Up Among All Women; Down Among Women
with Advanced Degrees, Pew Research Ctr. (June 25, 2010), http://pewresearch.org/pubs/ 1642/more-womenwithout-children.
33. See infra Part I.B.
34. See Reilly, supra note 28, at 157–58, 164–65. Abortion jurisprudence frequently contains
paternalistic concern for women’s mental health, suggesting, for example, that women who have an abortion
will regret their decision. Maya Manian, The Irrational Woman: Informed Consent and Abortion DecisionMaking, 16 Duke J. Gender L. & Pol’y 223, 290 (2009).
35. Petchesky, supra note 15, at 107.
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subrogate her needs—sexual and otherwise—to the needs of her fetus or
child.36 In reproductive health law, this means that the law focuses primarily
on how the medical treatment of her body impacts her ability to fulfill her
socially defined role as a mother.37
Abortion jurisprudence often conceptualizes all women as mothers or
potential mothers. Such laws push women toward “maternal” roles, even when
women are clearly rejecting motherhood, and ignore the importance of sex for
pleasure.38 Thus, abortion jurisprudence signals that to regulate women’s
reproductive autonomy, the law conceptualizes them as mothers. The law does
so often by invoking “maternal health” even when a woman attempts to avoid
motherhood. This signals desexualization, the notion that women should only
have sex for procreation, and ritualization, viewing and treating women
(pregnant or not) as “pre-mothers” and using the law to impose medical and
social practices associated with “good mothers” upon them.39
B. Abortion and Motherhood Via Maternal Health
In Roe v. Wade, the germinal case confirming the right to have an
abortion in some circumstances, the Supreme Court established a tripartite
framework to judge the constitutionality of abortion restrictions.40 In the
standard itself, the Court vacillates between treating the pregnant woman as a
woman or as a mother; its conceptualization of the woman seeking an abortion
is dependent upon the point at which she seeks to end the pregnancy.41 The
woman remains a person separate from the fetus until the end of the first
trimester: “For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester,
the abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment
of the pregnant woman’s attending physician.”42 The woman is still seen, at
this point, as a person experiencing a medical condition—pregnancy—not a
woman occupying the socially defined role of mother.43
However, at some point after the end of the first trimester, a “pregnant
woman’s” health becomes “maternal health” in the rhetoric of the decision,
suggesting that the woman is then a mother: “For the stage subsequent to
36. Badinter, supra note 15, at 12–14; Judith Warner, Perfect Madness: Motherhood in the Age of
Anxiety 61–71 (2005); Mary Ziegler, The Bonds That Tie: The Politics of Motherhood and the Future of
Abortion Rights, 21 Tex. J. Women & L. 47, 56–58 (2011).
37. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159–60 (2007); Nancy Ehrenreich, The Colonization of
the Womb, 43 Duke L.J. 492, 496–97 (1993).
38. State Policy Trends 2013: Abortion Bans Move to the Fore, Guttmacher Inst. (Apr. 11, 2013),
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2013/04/11/index.html.
39. See Mutcherson, supra note 20, at 337; infra Parts II, III.
40. 410 U.S. 113, 164–65 (1973).
41. Id. Roe did not give women a positive right—the right existed naturally. Robin West, From Choice to
Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 Yale L.J. 1394, 1403 (2009).
42. Roe, 410 U.S. at 164 (emphasis added).
43. But see Lisa C. Ikemoto, Abortion, Contraception and the ACA: The Realignment of Women’s
Health, 55 How. L.J. 731, 762–64 (2012) [hereinafter Ikemoto, The Realignment of Women’s Health] (arguing
that abortion has been disconnected from women’s health).
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approximately the end of the first trimester, the State, in promoting its interest
in the health of the mother, may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure
in ways that are reasonably related to maternal health.”44 That shift in
language is illustrative.45 From this point in the pregnancy, the State’s interest
is no longer conditioned solely on the pregnant woman’s body, but also on her
role as a mother.46
Many viewed Roe as empowering women because it ensured their ability
to control their reproductive lives and to do so safely. But while Roe restricted
the State’s ability to limit women’s access to abortion, it also empowered the
State.47 The decision specifically approved of abortion regulations during
certain points in pregnancy if those regulations were premised on protecting
“maternal health.”48 The Court uses the descriptor “mother” for women who
clearly rejected that role at that time—they chose to have an abortion.49 Roe
signaled a deeper social and legal shift toward conceptualizing all sexually
active women as mothers, a move that is now evident even outside of the
abortion context.50 As we will see, many of the most expansive actions of
courts and legislatures today rely on Roe and its progeny, either for its healthrelated language, for its language on the State’s interest in the fetus, or for the
general assertion that the State may regulate women’s bodies.
Some abortion cases subsequent to Roe chipped away at the right to
access abortion.51 Planned Parenthood v. Casey, for example, gave wide berth
to government regulation of the procedure.52 But issues related to the health of
pregnant women and their rejection of their socially defined role as mothers

44. Roe, 410 U.S at 164 (emphasis added). The Court’s use of the “mother” descriptor continues through
the “stage subsequent to viability” when it says the State “may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health
of the mother.” Roe, 410 U.S. at 164–65.
45. Martha Minow, Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 10, 13–14 (1987); Julie Novkov,
A Deconstruction of (M)otherhood and a Reconstruction of Parenthood, 19 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change
155, 159–60 (1992).
46. See Adrienne Rich, Of Woman Born: Motherhood as Experience and Institution 42 (1995); Ikemoto,
Code of Perfect Pregnancy, supra note 21, at 1285 (stating that reproduction-related regulations “devalue
women as persons by characterizing women as wombs”).
47. See generally Cristina Page, How the Pro-Choice Movement Saved America: Freedom, Politics, and
the War on Sex (2006) (discussing the continuing erosion of reproductive rights).
48. Roe vests the decision to have an abortion—and how to have that abortion—not with the woman, but
largely with her doctor. 410 U.S. at 164–65.
49. Id. at 120.
50. See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v. Wade, 56 Emory
L.J. 843, 844 (2007); Reilly, supra note 28, at 159–160; see also infra Parts II, III.
51. For a discussion of the health impact of major abortion rulings, see generally Beth A. BurkstrandReid, The Invisible Woman: Availability and Culpability in Reproductive Health Jurisprudence, 81 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 97 (2010) [hereinafter Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman]. For an overview of major abortion
decisions, see David Masci & Ira C. Lupu, A History of Key Abortion Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court, Pew
Research Ctr.: Religion & Pub. Life Project (Jan. 16, 2013), http://www.pewforum.org/Abortion/A-History-ofKey-Abortion-Rulings-of-the-US-Supreme-Court.aspx.
52. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 873–74 (1992). Casey also uses “mother” as
a descriptor of pregnant women. Id. at 860.
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came to a head in Gonzales v. Carhart, in which the Supreme Court upheld the
federal partial-birth abortion ban even though it did not include an exception
for the pregnant woman’s health.53
Although the very word choice in the Roe decision—the shift from
“pregnant woman” to “mother”—showed that pregnant women were
considered would-be mothers after the first trimester of pregnancy, Gonzales
further propelled the conceptualization of all pregnant women as mothers.
Gonzales explicitly invoked notions of maternal guilt to shame pregnant
women seeking an abortion and change their minds.54 The majority opinion
says:
Respect for human life finds an ultimate expression in the bond of love the
mother has for her child. . . . Whether to have an abortion requires a difficult
and painful moral decision. While we find no reliable data to measure the
phenomenon, it seems unexceptionable to conclude some women come to
regret their choice to abort the infant life they once created and sustained.
Severe depression and loss of esteem can follow.55

The opinion continues:
It is self-evident that a mother who comes to regret her choice to abort must
struggle with grief more anguished and sorrow more profound when she
learns, only after the event, what she once did not know: that she allowed a
doctor to pierce the skull and vacuum the fast-developing brain of her
unborn child, a child assuming the human form.56

These passages emphasize that the Court views women as mothers before
childbirth, that the role of “mother” impacts legal rights, and that the Court
believes that motherhood should impact the choices women make.
It cannot be overemphasized that the metaphysical transformation of
pregnant women into mothers in abortion jurisprudence was done to women
who were actively attempting to avoid the motherhood role at that time.57 So it
should come as no surprise that in non-abortion contexts, invocations of the
social role of mother is used to limit women’s reproductive and sexual
autonomy.
When stripped to its core, sexual and reproductive health jurisprudence
(abortion and beyond) is founded on what this Article labels desexualization
53. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 164–65 (2007).
54. Id. at 184–85 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); B. Jessie Hill, Dangerous Terrain: Mapping the Female
Body in Gonzales v. Carhart, 19 Colum. J. Gender & L. 649, 654–55 (2010).
55. Carhart, 550 U.S. at 159 (internal citations omitted). The abortion procedure at issue is called “partialbirth abortion,” evoking the ultimate experience of motherhood: birth. Id. at 125.
56. Id. at 159–60.
57. Casey, 505 U.S. at 928 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and
dissenting in part) (“By restricting the right to terminate pregnancies, the State conscripts women’s bodies into
its service, forcing women to continue their pregnancies, suffer the pains of childbirth, and in most instances,
provide years of maternal care. The State does not compensate women for their services; instead, it assumes
that they owe this duty as a matter of course.”); see Randi Hutter Epstein, Get Me Out: A History of Childbirth
from the Garden of Eden to the Sperm Bank 114 (2010) (repeating the adage that women are made to bring
children into the world); Balkin, supra note 50, at 851 (“[A]bortion laws treat women not as murderers, but as
mothers, as people who exist to rear children.”).

5. Burkstrand-Reid_28 (Do Not Delete) -- – DRAFT: DO NOT CITE

222

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/1/2013 11:33 AM

[Vol. 65:211

and ritualization, both of which reinforce the notion, so apparent in abortion
jurisprudence, that all women are or will be mothers and should be regulated
(and should themselves act) as such. “Desexualization” is the mechanism by
which the State expresses its moral disapproval of any type of sexual activity
other than sex for parenthood and, as a corollary, treats even the actions of
sexually active women (or women considering sexual activity) as tantamount
to accepting motherhood. “Ritualization” is the legally sanctioned use of the
rituals or rites of passage associated with continuing pregnancies to push
women toward accepting motherhood and behaving as “good mothers” even to
the detriment of their health or rights. Part II discusses the first of these tools,
desexualization, and how it contributes to the law’s manufacturing of mothers.

II. Which Comes First: Sex or Motherhood? Law and Desexualizing
Women
There is no doubt that many women enjoy sex, but are they supposed
to?58 Women are subjected to endless, sometimes conflicting, edicts about how
and whether they should express their sexuality.59 Desexualizing women
through the law minimizes the importance, or even denies the existence, of
women’s desire for sex for pleasure and then re-characterizes women’s sexual
actions as implicit acceptance of motherhood.60 It is the age-old division of
women into Madonnas and whores.61
Although the right of women to access contraceptives was recognized
decades ago, regulation of and access to contraceptives have again emerged as
legal issues.62 Two examples of this are the controversy surrounding
contraceptive coverage in the ACA,63 and the regulation of oral emergency
contraceptives, also called the morning-after pill, or referred to by the brand
names “Plan B” or “Plan B One-Step.”64 In both contexts, women are
desexualized, their desire to have sex for pleasure is delegitimized, and sexual

58. Joann Ellison Rodgers, Sex: A Natural History 8 (2001); Herbenick et al., supra note 3, at 255;
Daniel Kahneman et al., A Survey Method for Characterizing Daily Life Experience: The Day Reconstruction
Method, 306 Science 1776, 1777 (2004). Women also partake in—and sometimes lead companies in—the
nearly two billion dollar adult toy industry. Angus Loten, Why Sex Sells More Than Ever, Inc. (Jan. 25, 2008),
http://www.inc.com/articles/2008/01/sex.html.
59. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 385; Cas Wouters, Sexualization: Have Sexualization
Processes Changed Direction?, 13 Sexualities 723, 724–26 (2010).
60. Rosenbury & Rothman, supra note 1, at 809. But see Martha Chamallas, Consent, Equality, and the
Legal Control of Sexual Conduct, 61 S. Cal. L. Rev. 777, 838 (1988) (“A list of acceptable inducements [to
sex] would surely include procreation, emotional intimacy, and physical pleasure. Of these three inducements,
procreation probably plays a less significant social role today than either intimacy or pleasure.”).
61. Stevi Jackson & Sue Scott, Sexual Skirmishes and Feminist Factions: Twenty-Five Years of Debate
on Women and Sexuality, in Feminism and Sexuality: A Reader 3 (Stevi Jackson & Sue Scott eds., 1996).
62. See infra Parts II.B, C; see also Page, supra note 47, at 21 (asserting that some anti-abortion groups
equate contraceptives and abortion).
63. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.); see
infra Part II.B.
64. See infra Part II.C.
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activity is re-characterized as an affirmative step toward motherhood. And,
once again, any act that casts a woman as a “mother” expands the State’s
ability to intervene in her choices.
A. Defining Desexualization
A core aspect of conceptualizing women as mothers in the law is viewing
them—and treating them legally—as people who should engage in sexual
activity for the purpose of parenthood, not pleasure: this is desexualization.65
Desexualization consists of two actions: (1) shaming sex for pleasure and
(2) reinforcing a norm that sex should be for the purpose of procreation or, for
women more specifically, motherhood.
In society, motherhood and sexuality are in opposition.66 A woman’s
success as a mother is defined in part by perceptions about her sexuality; some
studies find that a less sexual mother is deemed to be a better mother.67 The
legal question, then, is when does a woman actually become a mother: upon a
child’s birth or sometime before?68 Abortion jurisprudence demonstrates that
the law labels a woman as a mother and her health “maternal” well before
birth. But as the debates raging about contraceptives show, a woman may be
conceptualized as a mother even before sex.69
The path to the desexualization of women in the law has been circuitous.
For example, the Supreme Court has not been entirely prudish when it has
confronted the issue of contraception, but that does not mean that it openly
accepts sex for pleasure. Early on, members of the Court in Poe v. Ullman
signaled that they recognized the importance of marital intimacy.70 The Court

65. Reilly, supra note 28, at 204 (describing “the assumptions that women are morally responsible only
when fulfilling traditional expectations of the mother-role”). “Desexualization” is used in many ways. See,
e.g., Charles Winick, Desexualization in American Life 1–2 (1995) (recognizing that “changes were occurring
in the social and sex roles, social structure, and popular culture” in the 1960s, when the book was written);
Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 385 (using desexualization to refer to changes mothers experience
post-partum); Wouters, supra note 59, at 726–28 (discussing desexualization in history, when sex was a duty
and not for pleasure); see also Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 880 (9th Cir. 1991) (Title VII); Elizabeth F.
Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 Harv. L. Rev. 1307,
1401 (2009) (Disability); Anthony C. Infanti, The Internal Revenue Code as Sodomy Statute, 44 Santa Clara L.
Rev. 763, 777 (2004) (Same-sex relationships); Morvareed Z. Salehpour, Election 2008: Sexism Edition: The
Problem of Sex Stereotyping, 19 UCLA Women’s L.J. 117, 134–35 (2012) (Politics).
66. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 367. See generally Ariella Friedman et al., Sexuality and
Motherhood: Mutually Exclusive in Perception of Women, 38 Sex Roles 781 (1998).
67. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 385; Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 796–99.
68. Beth A. Burkstrand-Reid, The More Things Change . . .: Abortion Politics & the Regulation of
Assisted Reproductive Technology, 79 UMKC L. Rev. 361, 370–72 (2010) [hereinafter Burkstrand-Reid, The
More Things Change]; Jane C. Murphy, Legal Images of Motherhood: Conflicting Definitions From Welfare
“Reform,” Family, and Criminal Law, 83 Cornell L. Rev. 688, 689 (1998).
69. Page, supra note 47, at 30 (“[C]hildren are an intended purpose of intercourse, and parents should
therefore act to responsibly care for and protect their pre-born children.”).
70. Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 548 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting); id. at 519–20 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting); Brenda Cossman, Sexual Citizens: The Legal and Cultural Regulation of Sex and Belonging 23–
24 (2007).
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took a step toward recognizing the importance of sex for pleasure in Griswold
v. Connecticut, which confirmed that married persons had the right to use
contraceptives.71 The Griswold Court said that “intimacy” had a role in the
lives of married couples (and thus in the lives of married women) but, as the
decision did not dwell on sex itself, the precedent focused on relationship
building rather than pleasure.72 By focusing on the marital relationship,
Griswold also impliedly served a shaming function against sexually active
people who were not married.73
Later, in Eisenstadt v. Baird, the Court jumped into law and sexuality
with both feet by confirming that “whatever the rights of the individual to
access to contraceptives may be, the rights must be the same for the unmarried
and the married alike.”74 But again, the right did not focus on sex for pleasure.
The Court’s discomfort with sexuality lingered in tone, calling sex by the
euphemism “the physical act.”75 Shaming was not overt, but the Court’s
discomfort with sexual activity was.76
The inevitable successor to the contraception cases—abortion
jurisprudence—shows how the seed of the Court’s discomfort with sexuality
grew into desexualization and, eventually, would be expressed in legislation
and jurisprudence.77 Roe obscured the significance of physical intimacy by
implicitly shaming sexually active women who were not married.78 Women
seeking an abortion were pushed toward accepting the role of mother.79
Roe’s companion case, Doe v. Bolton, further cast women having sex
outside of marriage as sexually suspect. In Doe, the Court went out of its way
to establish that the “situation did not involve extramarital sex and its product,”
71. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965).
72. Id. at 482 (“This law, however, operates directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and
their physician’s role in one aspect of that relation.”); see Law, supra note 2, at 226; see also Lawrence v.
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 565 (2003) (“After Griswold, it was established that the right to make certain decisions
regarding sexual conduct extends beyond the marital relationship.”).
73. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (“Finally, it should be said of the Court’s
holding today that it in no way interferes with a State’s proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or
misconduct.”).
74. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972); see Kendall Thomas, Beyond the Privacy Principle,
92 Colum. L. Rev. 1431, 1446 (1992).
75. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 451 n.8.
76. The Court acknowledged, however, that sex for pleasure happened. Id. at 452–53 (“To say that
contraceptives are immoral as such, and are to be forbidden to unmarried persons who will nevertheless persist
in having intercourse, means that such persons must risk for themselves an unwanted pregnancy, for the child,
illegitimacy, and for society, a possible obligation of support.”); see also Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578.
77. Abortion regulations “impair the possibility of sexual pleasure for women, and aggravate the force of
sexual fear.” Reva Siegel, Reasoning from the Body: A Historical Perspective on Abortion Regulation and
Questions of Equal Protection, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 261, 371 (1992).
78. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 120 (noting that Roe was not married); id. at 164 (stating the abortion
decision “must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician”).
79. Id. at 120, 164–65. But see Posner, supra note 19, at 333 (discussing the Roe decision as one
supporting “morally indifferent sex”); see Courtney Megan Cahill, Abortion and Disgust, 48 Harv. C.R.-C.L.
L. Rev. 409, 442 (2013) (discussing how abortion stigma relates to “shame associated with conduct that
defines deeply rooted beliefs about women’s social and biological roles”).
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implying that women who do not transgress that boundary are somehow more
worthy of constitutional protection than those who do.80 The Court’s decision
exemplifies how motherhood is treated as a “social institution,” one that
facilitates the control of women: in this case, their sexuality.81
Planned Parenthood v. Casey further retreated from Eisenstadt’s limited
recognition of sex for pleasure. Although Casey recognizes that intimate
decisionmaking relies to some degree on the availability of abortion, the
decision, in part, grounded women’s right to choose abortion in their ability to
succeed as workers.82 Sex and pregnancy were, at least in part, treated as
economic issues and, at least impliedly, not issues of pleasure.83 Casey
abandoned Roe’s trimester framework in favor of the amorphous “undue
burden” standard.84 In Casey, the State interest in women’s health begins to
become a veil for a more politicized interest—the pre-viable fetus.85 This
interest in the pre-viable fetus further catapulted women toward motherhood.86
The government’s ability to directly regulate sex was arguably curtailed
by Lawrence v. Texas, in which the Supreme Court struck down a Texas
sodomy statute, but Lawrence may have had as much—if not more—to do
with preserving an individual’s interest in building intimate relationships than
in an individual’s interest in sex in and of itself.87 Even as it discussed Casey,
Lawrence tied the right to engage in homosexual conduct to “persons in a
homosexual relationship.”88 In Gonzales, however, the relationship at issue
turned from one between adults to one between the pregnant woman and her
fetus, directly implicating motherhood.
Gonzales linked women’s sexuality to the rights of the fetus and thus
propelled women toward motherhood.89 Gonzales imbues the sexual act itself

80. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 196 (1973).
81. Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 783.
82. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 856 (“The ability of women to participate
equally in the economic and social life of the Nation has been facilitated by their ability to control their
reproductive lives.”).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 878–79 (retaining Roe’s life and health exceptions, using both “woman” and “mother,” and
reaffirming Roe’s viability-related holding).
85. Id. at 872–73; Caitlin E. Borgmann, Winter Count: Taking Stock of Abortion Rights After Casey and
Carhart, 31 Fordham Urb. L.J. 675, 681 (2004).
86. Casey, 505 U.S. at 878 (“To promote the State’s profound interest in potential life, throughout
pregnancy the State may take measures to ensure that the woman’s choice is informed, and measures designed
to advance this interest will not be invalidated as long as their purpose is to persuade the woman to choose
childbirth over abortion. These measures must not be an undue burden on the right.”).
87. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003) (“The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship
that, whether or not entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose without
being punished as criminals. This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to
define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an
institution the law protects.”); Kaplan, supra note 2 (arguing that Lawrence was less about sex and more about
relationships).
88. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573–74 (emphasis added).
89. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 159 (2007).
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with the intent to parent: it warns women, addressing them as mothers, that
they may regret ending “the infant life they once created and sustained” and
cautioned that the woman’s health may suffer from a decision to abort.90 This
so-called “fetal personhood” rhetoric implies that, once conceived, a fetus is a
separate person with rights, thus, it has a mother.91 Women are told that they
“should become instantaneously ‘motherly’ from the moment of conception.”92
This contributes to what some call “maternal-fetal conflict,” the purported
clash of rights between a pregnant woman and the fetus.93 Thus, women
remain desexualized, purportedly destined to be mothers and expected to
behave as such. If the State “couldn’t stop growing numbers of women from
climbing into the sexual driver’s seat, they could at least make the women’s
drive more dangerous—by jamming the reproductive controls,” and courts
facilitate that move.94
B. Sluts or Mothers: “Pre-Pregnant” Women, Desexualization, and
Obamacare95
Sex conjures notions of unbridled passion but also of unconstrained
power, especially when it comes to women having sex for pleasure.96 By using
contraceptives, sexually active women gain some measure of legal autonomy
by exhibiting power over their bodies and lives. However, there is a growing
backlash against access to contraceptives, which reflects the view that “real
women have babies”: they do not have sex for pleasure, which requires
contraceptives; they only have sex for procreation, which does not.97 As these
laws become more entrenched, women will continue to be desexualized
through contraception policy, litigation, and regulation.

90. Id. Researchers have questioned the Court’s implication that women who have an abortion suffer
from mental health problems as a result. See Vignetta E. Charles et al., Abortion and Long-Term Mental
Health Outcomes: A Systematic Review of the Evidence, 78 Contraception 436, 445–49 (2008) (finding that
high-quality research has suggested few if any negative mental health differences between women who have
and have not had abortions).
91. Caitlin E. Borgmann, The Meaning of “Life”: Belief and Reason in the Abortion Debate, 18 Colum J.
Gender & L. 551, 562 (2009).
92. Rosalind Pollack Petchesky, Abortion And Woman’s Choice: The State, Sexuality, and Reproductive
Freedom 341 (rev. ed. 1990); see Hill, supra note 54, at 663–64.
93. Deborah Tuerkheimer, Conceptualizing Violence Against Pregnant Women, 81 Indiana L.J. 667,
688–95 (2006). For an extensive discussion of the regulation of pregnancy, see Ikemoto, Code of Perfect
Pregnancy, supra note 21.
94. Susan Faludi, Backlash: The Undeclared War Against American Women 405 (1991).
95. See January W. Payne, Forever, Wash. Post (May 16, 2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wpdyn/content/article/2006/05/15/AR2006051500875.html (discussing the treatment of women as “prepregnant”); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codified in
scattered sections of 26 and 42 U.S.C.).
96. Cossman, supra note 70, at 24–25 (stating that “patrolling the borders” of when sex is and is not
legitimate still took place after Roe); Klein, supra note 7, at 3; Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 783 (“As long as a
woman’s sexuality remains in the family sphere and is channeled to procreation, it receives full legitimacy. When
her sexuality is ‘uncontrolled’ it is seen as illegitimate and is criticized and penalized.”).
97. Valenti, supra note 25, at 151–52.
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Ninety-nine percent of sexually active women use contraception at some
point in their lives, making its use “virtually universal” in the United States.98
More specifically, a survey of women conducted between 2006 and 2008
found that eighty-two percent of women have used oral contraceptives and ten
percent have used emergency contraceptives—more than double the proportion
of women who had used emergency contraceptives in 2002.99 According to the
Guttmacher Institute, the “typical American woman” who wants two children
must use some mechanism of contraception for three decades.100 The
connection between contraception and women’s health, broadly defined, is
clear: contraceptives reduce maternal mortality and improve maternal-fetal
outcomes by preventing unplanned pregnancies.101 Contraceptives also have
numerous other health benefits for women, including protection against certain
cancers.102
The morality of contraception—or of sex for pleasure—resurfaced
dramatically recently due to the ACA mandate requiring “women’s preventive
health care—such as mammograms, screenings for cervical cancer, prenatal
care, and other services—generally must be covered by health plans with no
cost sharing” including “[c]ontraceptive methods and counseling.”103 This
mandate infuriated some employers and state governments, which alleged that
the mandate violated religious freedom by forcing some employers not
qualified for a religious exemption under the ACA to cover health services—
such as contraceptives—that conflict with their faith.104 Implicit in the

98. Mosher & Jones, supra note 13, at 5 (stating that nearly one hundred percent of sexually active
women ages fifteen to forty-four surveyed from 2006 to 2008 who have ever had intercourse with a man have
at some point in their lifetime used contraceptives, natural or artificial).
99. Id.
100. Rachel Benson Gold et al., Guttmacher Inst., Next Steps for America’s Family Planning Program:
Leveraging the Potential of Medicaid and Title X in an Evolving Health Care System 6 (2009).
101. Marcia P. Harrigan & Suzanne M. Baldwin, Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, in Dimensions
of Human Behavior: The Changing Life Course 53, 56–57 (Elizabeth D. Hutchinson ed., 2d ed. 2003); see
Kenneth R. Weiss, Contraception Key to Reducing Child, Maternal Deaths, Experts Say, L.A. Times (July 12,
2013),
http://www.latimes.com/news/science/sciencenow/la-sci-sn-contraception-key-to-reducing-childmaternal-deaths-experts-say-20130712,0,1549550.story.
102. Boston Women’s Health Book Collective, Our Bodies, Ourselves 225 (2011) [hereinafter Our
Bodies, Ourselves].
103. See Health Resources & Servs. Admin., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Women’s Preventive
Services Guidelines, http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Oct. 6, 2013); see also Remarks by the
President on Preventive Care (Feb. 10, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/ the-pressoffice/2012/02/10/remarks-president-preventive-care. For a collection of news articles on healthcare reform, see
also
Health
Care
Reform,
N.Y.
Times
(Times
Topics),
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/
news/health/diseasesconditionsandhealthtopics/health_insurance_and_managed_care/
health_care_reform/index.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
104. Caroline Mala Corbin, The Contraception Mandate, 107 N.W. U.L. Rev. Colloquy 151, 151 (2012);
7 States Sue Over Obama Administration’s Birth Control Rule, USA Today (Feb. 23, 2012),
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2012-02-23/states-sue-obama-birthcontrol/53228212/1; Warren Richey, Obama Administration Backs Out of Appeal Over New Contraceptive
Mandate, Christian Sci. Monitor
(May 6, 2013, 8:58 PM), http://www.csmonitor.com/
USA/Justice/2013/0506/Obama-administration-backs-out-of-appeal-over-new-contraceptive-mandate-video;
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objections is the notion that sex for pleasure should not be subsidized,
suggesting that sex for procreation is the only appropriate type of sex.105
President Obama later offered compromises concerning the contraception
mandate, attempting to assuage employers’ concerns, though those
compromises did little to avert litigation over the validity of the ACA.106
On one hand, the ACA contraception mandate can be seen as the
quintessential government recognition that women do have sex for pleasure—
and should be able to have sex for pleasure—without suffering from undesired
consequences. The pushback on the ACA by other government actors,
employers, media pundits, states, and individual lawmakers, however,
emphasizes the vast the disapproval of women’s non-procreative sexuality.107
One prime example: Sandra Fluke.
Fluke, then a law student at Georgetown University, was scheduled to
testify before Congress on the importance of contraceptive coverage but was
refused by the United States House Committee on Oversight and Government
Reform.108 She later testified before a panel of House Democrats.109 Her
testimony was followed by comments from media personality Rush Limbaugh:
What does it say about the college coed Susan Fluke [sic], who goes before a
congressional committee and essentially says that she must be paid to have
sex? What does that make her? It makes her a slut, right? It makes her a
prostitute. She wants to be paid to have sex. She’s having so much sex she
can’t afford the contraception. She wants you and me and the taxpayers to
pay her to have sex. What does that make us? We’re the pimps.110

By lobbying for contraceptive coverage, Fluke was “happily presenting
herself as an immoral, baseless, no-purpose-to-her life woman;” attending an
elite law school and becoming a lawyer was not a legitimate life purpose for a

HHS
Mandate
Information
Central,
Becket
Fund
for
Religious
Liberty,
http://www.becketfund.org/hhsinformationcentral/ (last visited Sept. 8, 2013) (identifying 67 cases and more
than 200 plaintiffs). The type of contraceptive objected to varies. FAQs: Becket Fund’s Lawsuits Against HHS,
Becket Fund For Religious Liberty, http://www.becketfund.org/faq/#f5 (last visited Oct. 23 2013) (“Although
many of these institutions do not have objections to traditional contraception, all are opposed to abortioninducing drugs, such as the ‘morning after pill’ and ‘week after pill.’”)
105. Certainly, some women who use contraceptives are already mothers in that they have given birth to
children. The analysis applies to these women, too, as they may be attempting to prevent additional
pregnancies.
106. Morgan Whitaker, Obama Tweaks Birth Control Mandate to Accommodate Religious Groups,
MSNBC.com (Feb. 1, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://tv.msnbc.com/2013/02/01/obama-clarifies-contraceptionmandate-to-accomodate-religious-groups; see 45 C.F.R. § 147.130-131 (2013) (outlining the requirements for
a “religious employer”).
107. See infra notes 114–116.
108. Alexa Keyes, Contraception Controversy Continues: Meet Witness Sandra Fluke, ABC News
(Feb. 23, 2012, 2:34 PM) http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2012/02/contraception-controversy-continuesmeet-witness-sandra-fluke.
109. Id.
110. Media Matters Staff, Limbaugh: Student Denied Spot at Contraception Hearing Says “She Must Be
Paid to Have Sex,” So She’s A “Slut” and “Prostitute”, Media Matters for Am. (Feb. 29, 2012, 2:46 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/video/2012/02/29/limbaugh-student-denied-spot-at-contraception-h/186411 (providing
a recording and transcript of Rush Limbaugh’s comments about Sandra Fluke).
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woman, and, if there was any legitimacy in that endeavor, the potential of any
woman to have non-procreative sex overshadowed her accomplishments.111
Fluke was forced into the role of mother-in-waiting because she was assumed
to be sexually active. And, the only legitimate “purpose to her life,” if she had
sex, would be to procreate.
Limbaugh may have been the most famous talking head to address the
contraception mandate, and his comments were histrionic at best, but he is far
from the only prominent person to publically decry the law. Company after
company, school after school, state after state, and lawmaker after lawmaker
fought contraceptive coverage, even directly challenging the value of sex for
pleasure.112 Former presidential candidate Rick Santorum, the state of
Nebraska, Hobby Lobby, and Domino’s Pizza are just a few.113
Regardless of whether the asserted sexual authority of the religious right
trumps the autonomy of women as the ACA winds its way through the courts,
any failure to cover contraceptives—and, therefore, recognize sexuality—
contributes to women’s desexualization in society. These attacks thus buttress
entrenchment of desexualization by the State by eliminating resources that
would allow women the ability to avoid or delay motherhood. This is the
essence of desexualization.
The ACA controversy demonstrates that desexualization and its
relationship with law and public policy begins long before pregnancy.114 But
the contraception mandate controversy is merely a gateway to how law and
policy express desexualization. Desexualization intensifies as a tool for
transforming women into mothers when women have already had sex and are
dealing with a potential consequence: pregnancy.

111. Media Matters Staff, UPDATED: Limbaugh’s Misogynistic Attack On Georgetown Law Student
Continues With Increased Vitriol, Media Matters for Am. (Mar. 1, 2012, 3:26 PM),
http://mediamatters.org/blog/2012/03/01/updated-limbaughs-misogynistic-attack-on-george/184248 (providing
summary and recording of Rush Limbaugh’s comments).
112. Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, supra note 104 (detailing lawsuits filed over the ACA mandate);
Irin Carmon, Rick Santorum is Coming for Your Birth Control, Salon (Jan. 4, 2012, 6:30 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2012/01/04/rick_santorum_is_coming_for_your_birth_control.
113. See, e.g., Monaghan v. Sebelius, No. 12-15488, 2013 WL 1014026, at *1 (E.D. Mich. Mar. 14, 2013);
Bruning v. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 877 F. Supp. 2d 777, 779 (D. Neb. 2012); Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc.
v. Sebelius, No. 12-1000, 2013 WL 3869832, at *1 (W.D. Okla. July 19, 2013); Terry Baynes, U.S. Court Accepts
Challenge
to
Obama
Contraception
Rule,
Reuters
(June
28,
2013,
2:07 AM),
http://in.reuters.com/article/2013/06/27/us-hobby-lobby-contraception-idINBRE95Q15N20130627; see also,
Carmon, supra note 112.
114. Preventative care is sometimes referred to as “[p]reconception and interconception care,” which are
“health care services and supports that are provided prior to a pregnancy . . . designed to assure that women are
healthy before conception in order to improve pregnancy-related outcomes.” Carolyn Mullen, The Affordable
Care
Act
and
Preconception
Health,
Pulse
9–10,
Nov.
2011,
available
at
http://www.amchp.org/AboutAMCHP/Newsletters/Pulse/Documents/Pulse_November11.pdf.
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C. Motherhood the Morning After
Women trying to avoid pregnancy can use pre-intercourse contraceptives,
some without a prescription and some, including oral contraceptives, with a
prescription.115 There are also oral, post-coital contraceptives, sometimes
called emergency contraception, the morning-after pill, or the brand names
“Plan B” or “Plan B One-Step.”116 Recently, some emergency contraceptives
were made available without a prescription, but availability was restricted on
the basis of age.117 Efforts to make some emergency contraceptives available
without a prescription and without age restrictions carried on for years and
only recently achieved some success.118
Emergency contraception does not implicate motherhood or maternal
health: there is no “mother” involved.119 The concept of “maternal” health
generally, and abortion more specifically, should have no bearing on the
regulation of emergency contraceptives, which prevent—not end—
pregnancy.120 Yet as the controversies surrounding the availability of
emergency contraceptives show, engaging in intercourse may signal that a
woman has accepted the role of mother, even as she tries to prevent
motherhood.
Similar to pre-coital contraceptives,121 emergency contraceptives prevent
pregnancy by stopping ovulation.122 Emergency contraceptives must be taken

115. Planned Parenthood, Birth Control Pills, http://www.plannedparenthood.org/health-topics/birthcontrol/birth-control-pill-4228.htm (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (reporting that pills cost as much as $50 per
month and a medical exam prior to getting them, at a cost of up to $250, may be necessary).
116. There are numerous types of emergency contraceptives. See Types of Emergency Contraception, The
Emergency Contraception Website, http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/brands-usa.html (last visited Oct. 6,
2013) (providing information from the Office of Population Research at Princeton University and the
Association of Reproductive Health Professionals on various types of oral emergency contraceptives); CopperT
IUD
as
Emergency
Contraception,
The
Emergency
Contraception
Website,
http://ec.princeton.edu/info/eciud.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (describing the use of an IUD as emergency
contraception). Emergency contraception or contraceptives in this Article refers to oral emergency
contraception or contraceptives. See Emergency Contraception State Laws, Nat’l Conference of State
Legislators, http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/ emergency-contraception-state-laws.aspx (last updated
Aug. 2012) (discussing state emergency contraception regulations, including dispensing by pharmacists).
117. See News Release, Food & Drug Admin., FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Emergency Contraceptive
for Use Without a Prescription for All Women of Child-Bearing Potential (June 20, 2013), available at
http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm358082.htm
[hereinafter
FDA
Approves Plan B One-Step Without Prescription] (saying Plan B One-Step was approved in 2009 for use by
women age seventeen and over; the age was lowered to fifteen in April 2013).
118. Id. (approving Plan B One-Step for all women on a non-prescription basis); Tummino v. Hamburg,
Memorandum, No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 2631163, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. June 12, 2013) (discussing levonorgestrelbased contraceptives).
119. See Mother Definition, supra note 10.
120. How Emergency Contraception Works, The Emergency Contraception Website,
http://ec.princeton.edu/questions/ecabt.html (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
121. FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Without Prescription, supra note 117 (“The product contains higher
levels of a hormone found in some types of daily use oral hormonal contraceptive pills and works in a similar
way to these contraceptive pills by stopping ovulation and therefore preventing pregnancy.”). For general
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quickly after intercourse in order to maximize efficacy.123 Although some antireproductive-rights advocates argue that emergency contraceptives may
prevent a fertilized egg from implanting in the uterus, scientists say there is no
evidence that emergency contraceptives function in that capacity.124 In other
words, studies—and the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”)—contend
that emergency contraceptives do not end an established pregnancy.125 Still,
some argue that emergency contraceptives are abortifacients. For example, the
American Right to Life organization says that “the greatest danger of the
‘Morning After Pill’ is that it is designed to kill a child.”126
In addition to the initial, prescription-only status of emergency
contraceptives, access to the medications has been restricted in other ways. The
federal government, until recently, restricted availability based on age.127
Additionally, pharmacists—and perhaps even others—may be allowed to
refuse to dispense emergency contraceptives.
The sexuality of young women is perhaps the most feared sexuality of all
as, in most cases, it is overtly sex for pleasure.128 It can also have massive,
unintended ramifications in terms of unplanned pregnancy.129
information on oral contraceptives, see FAQ: Birth Control Pills, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists
(Mar. 2013), http://www.acog.org/~/media /For%20Patients/ faq021.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20130619T2102509049.
122. Pam Belluck, Abortion Qualms on Morning-After Pill May Be Unfounded, N.Y. Times (June 5,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/06/health/research/morning-after-pills-dont-block-implantationscience-suggests.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (asserting that the debate over how emergency contraceptives
work has been largely resolved and that it is not an abortifacient, but discussing contrary views).
123. FAQ: Emergency Contraception, Am. Coll. of Obstetricians & Gynecologists(Aug. 2011),
http://www.acog.org/~/media/For%20Patients/faq114.pdf?dmc=1&ts=20130619T2106435514.
124. Id.; Belluck, supra note 122.
125. See FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Without Prescription, supra note 117 (“Plan B One-Step will
not stop a pregnancy when a woman is already pregnant and there is no medical evidence that the product will
harm a developing fetus.”); Belluck, supra note 122 (citing Mayo Clinic physicians, National Institutes of
Health, and International Federation of Gynecology and Obstetrics officials as saying emergency contraception
does not work post-fertilization).
126. Plan B Side Effect On Younger and Younger Girls, Am. Right to Life,
http://americanrtl.org/news/plan-b-side-effect-daughters (last visited Oct. 6, 2013); see Elizabeth Shadigian,
Letter to the FDA Regarding Over-The-Counter Status For Plan B, Am. Ass’n of Pro-Life Obstetricians &
Gynecologists,
http://www.aaplog.org/position-and-papers/emergency-contraception/letter-to-the-fdaregarding-over-the-counter-status-for-plan-b (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (“Plan B’s labeling does not give
adequate notice to a potential user that Plan B may prevent the implantation of a human embryo (e.g., a
fertilized ovum) as one mechanism of action, thus acting as an abortifacient.”); Plan B [Emergency Abortion
Pill] FAQs, Pharmacists for Life Int’l, http://www.pfli.org/main.php?pfli=planbfaq (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
127. See Plan B: Questions and Answers, Food & Drug Admin., http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/
DrugSafety/PostmarketDrugSafetyInformationforPatientsandProviders/ucm109783.htm (last updated Dec. 14,
2006) (announcing Plan B approval over-the-counter for women eighteen years and older).
128. See generally Sinikka Elliott, Not My Kid: What Parents Believe About the Sex Lives of Their
Teenagers (2012) (discussing the disconnect between actual sexual activity and parental perceptions of it);
Amy T. Schalet, Not Under My Roof: Parents, Teens, and the Culture of Sex (2011) (comparing U.S. attitudes
toward teen sex with other countries); Deborah L. Tolman, Dilemmas of Desire: Teenage Girls Talk about
Sexuality (2002) (discussing fear over girls’ sexuality); Valenti, Purity Myth, supra note 6 (discussing the
harm girls face from lacking a comprehensive understanding of sexuality); In Brief: Fact Sheet, Facts on
American
Teens’
Sexual
and
Reproductive
Health,
Guttmacher
Inst.
(June
2013),
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-ATSRH.html (reporting that fewer than two percent of adolescents

5. Burkstrand-Reid_28 (Do Not Delete) -- – DRAFT: DO NOT CITE

232

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

12/1/2013 11:33 AM

[Vol. 65:211

In 2011, Department of Health and Human Services Secretary Kathleen
Sebelius refused to follow the guidance of FDA staff, who recommended that
Plan B One-Step be made more widely available to young women without a
prescription.130 She rejected the recommendations of her own agency and said
that there was insufficient proof that young women could understand how to
use the drug or the consequences of its use.131 Ultimately, her actions were
called “obviously political” by a federal district court judge, who ordered the
FDA to “make levonorgestrel-based emergency contraceptives available
without a prescription and without point-of-sale or age restrictions.”132
Eventually, after the Second Circuit denied in part the government’s request
for a stay pending appeal, the Obama administration capitulated: Plan B OneStep was made available without a prescription or point-of-sale restrictions
regardless of a woman’s age (assuming that a woman can afford it and is not
otherwise obstructed from accessing it).133 Obstructions, however, are likely;

younger than twelve are sexually active, sixteen percent by age fifteen, one-third by age sixteen, and that
750,000 teens between fifteen and nineteen years old get pregnant each year). A minor’s right to access
contraceptives has long been controversial, as is seen in the fragmented decision in Carey v. Population
Control Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977), and discussed in Angela Patterson, Carey v. Population Services
International: Minors’ Right to Access Contraceptives, 14 J. Contemp. Legal Issues 469 (2004); see also State
Policies in Brief, Minors’ Access to Contraceptive Services, Guttmacher Inst. (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MACS.pdf.
129. Teen Pregnancy Prevention, Nat’l Conference of State Legislatures, http://www.ncsl.org/issuesresearch/health/teen-pregnancy-prevention.aspx (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) (“Teenage mothers are less likely to
finish high school and are more likely than their peers to live in poverty, depend on public assistance, and be in
poor health. Their children are more likely to suffer health and cognitive disadvantages, come in contact with
the child welfare and correctional systems, live in poverty, drop out of high school and become teen parents
themselves. According to the National Campaign to Prevent Teen and Unplanned Pregnancy, the annual public
cost of teen childbearing—due to higher costs of public health care, foster care, incarceration and lost tax
revenue—is nearly $11 billion.”).
130. News Release, Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., A Statement by U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services Secretary Kathleen Sebelius (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.hhs.gov/
news/press/2011pres/12/20111207a.html [hereinafter Sebelius Statement] (using the terms “Plan B One-Step”,
“emergency contraceptive,” and “morning after pill” in the release).
131. News Release, Food & Drug Admin., Statement from FDA Commissioner Margaret Hamburg, M.D.,
on Plan B One-Step (Dec. 7, 2011), available at http://www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/ Newsroom/ucm282805.htm
[hereinafter Hamburg Statement]; Sebelius Statement, supra note 130; Sam Baker, Left ‘Speechless’ as
Sebelius Overrules FDA on Access to Morning-After Pill, The Hill (Dec. 7, 2011),
http://thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/abortion/197825-sebelius-overrules-fda-blocks-access-to-plan-b
(discussing the notion that the secretary “bow[ed] to political pressure” and ignored her own agency’s
scientists); HHS Overrules FDA, Limiting Plan B for Teens Under 17, USA Today (Dec. 8, 2011),
http://www.usatoday.com/news/health/healthcare/health/healthcare/story/2011-12-07/FDA-debates-over-thecounter-morning-after-pill/51699388/1.
132. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 1348656, at *7, *31 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2013). This
was not the first time the district court noted political interference in emergency contraception regulation.
Tummino v. Torti, 603 F. Supp. 2d 519, 547–50 (E.D.N.Y. 2009) (ordering the FDA to make Plan B available
to women age 17 without a prescription).
133. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 13-1690, 2013 WL 2435370, at *1 (2d Cir. June 5, 2013) (“Insofar as the
district court order requires Appellants to immediately provide over-the-counter access to the one-pill variants
of emergency contraceptives, a stay, pending appeal, is granted. Insofar as the order mandates immediate overthe-counter access to the two-pill variants of emergency contraceptives, a stay is denied because the
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despite the non-prescription status and lack of age restrictions for Plan B OneStep, pharmacists have already said they may continue to keep it behind the
counter and limit access by age.134
From a policy perspective, the regulation of emergency contraception for
minors exposes a paradox. If we break down desexualization, we see that it
involves two steps: (1) a shaming of sex for pleasure, and (2) a push toward
motherhood. The first move of desexualization may seem appropriate when it
comes to young women.135 However, taking the second step and pushing
young women toward motherhood is counterintuitive. Once unprotected sex
has occurred, opponents of non-prescription emergency contraceptives for
younger women appear to fear the possibility of promiscuity among young
women more than they fear teen pregnancy, even though studies show the
availability of emergency contraceptives does not increase sexual activity.136
This is remarkable; once they have sex, young women were—and arguably
still are—pushed toward motherhood seemingly as a punishment either for
failure to use contraceptives or for being sexually active at all.137 This is
desexualization. Whether young or not, women are not to have sex for pleasure
and, if they do, they are deemed to have accepted the role of mother, no matter
their age.
Government actions to limit the availability of emergency contraceptives
propel women toward motherhood and do so without providing health
information related to pregnancy. Sebelius, for example, said that young girls
might not understand the Plan B One-Step label, justifying limitations on its
availability.138 Her actions suggested that young women could not make good
Appellants have failed to meet the requisite standard.”). FDA Approves Plan B One-Step Without a
Prescription, supra note 117; Letter from U.S. Attorney, E.D.N.Y. Loretta E. Lynch to Hon. Edward R.
Korman (June 10, 2013), available at http://media.npr.org/documents/ 2013/jun/justiceletter.pdf (asserting that
the government had complied with the Court’s prior judgment and that the FDA “will not at this time take
steps” to change the status of other emergency contraceptives). For information regarding the regulatory status
of other contraceptives, see Where Should EC Be? FDA-Approved Emergency Contraceptive Products as of
August 1, 2013, Reprod. Health Techs. Project, http://www.rhtp.org/contraception/emergency/documents/
WhereShouldECBe.August12013.pdf.
134. Meeri Kim, Questions About Effect of Over-The-Counter Plan B for All Ages, Wash. Post (June 29,
2013), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-06-29/national/40268209_1_emergency-contraception-plan-bone-step-age-restrictions.
135. But see Valenti, Purity Myth, supra note 6, at 9–10 (arguing that the focus on virginity discourages
girls from safe expressions of sexuality).
136. Klein, supra note 7, at 38; see Carey v. Population Control Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 694–95 (1977)
(quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972)). But see Editorial: Docs Push Plan B: Putting Girls’
Health
at
Risk
to
Prevent
Pregnancy,
Wash.
Times
(Nov. 29,
2012),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/nov/29/docs-push-plan-b.
137. See supra note 136. See generally Valenti, Purity Myth, supra note 6 (discussing how girls are taught
to fear their sexuality).
138. Compare Hamburg Statement, supra note 131 (“[Plan B One-Step] was safe and effective in
adolescent females, that adolescent females understood the product was not for routine use, and that the
product would not protect them against sexually transmitted diseases. Additionally, the data supported a
finding that adolescent females could use Plan B One-Step properly without the intervention of a healthcare
provider.”), with Sebelius Statement, supra note 130 (“the actual use study and the label comprehension study
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health decisions related to contraception, but at the same time, young women’s
ability to make good health decisions related to pregnancy—which carries with
it health risks, too—were not discussed in her statement, thus undermining any
argument that the Plan B One-Step restriction was intended as a health
protection.139 Her invocation of girls’ health to deny access to emergency
contraceptives was particularly disingenuous given that the drug was still
available to girls by prescription.140 According to prominent physicians, “[a]ny
objective review makes it clear that Plan B is more dangerous to politicians
than to adolescent girls.”141 We will see this misleading use of women’s health
against women’s autonomy again in the context of abortion and cesarean
sections.142
Moreover, some states have enacted laws that allow some healthcare
providers to deny women access to reproductive health services.143 These laws
were first passed in response to Roe and allow medical providers, among other
actions, to refuse to dispense drugs that may conflict with their moral or
religious beliefs.144 Changes in the way that emergency contraceptives are
dispensed may lessen the potential impact of pharmacist refusal. However,
opportunities for pharmacists and other employees of retailers that sell Plan B
One-Step to obstruct access will undoubtedly still exist.145
Refusing to dispense emergency contraceptives is tantamount to declaring
a sexually active woman to be “pregnant,” and thus a mother, the instant she
has sex.146 Women are explicitly desexualized through these clauses. When
healthcare providers refuse to dispense emergency contraceptives, they push
women toward motherhood, often with State support.147
are not sufficient to support making Plan B One-Step available to all girls 16 and younger, without talking to a
health care professional.”); Ikemoto, The Realignment of Women’s Health, supra note 43, at 766.
139. See generally Heidi Murkoff & Sharon Mazel, What to Expect When You’re Expecting (2008)
(discussing various health risks women face when pregnant).
140. Tummino v. Hamburg, No. 12-0763, 2013 WL 1348656, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 2013).
141. Alastair J.J. Wood et al., The Politics of Emergency Contraception, 366 New Eng. J. Med. 101, 102
(2012).
142. See infra Part III.
143. State “conscience clause” laws allow medical providers to deny healthcare services based on their
individual beliefs. Pharmacist Conscience Clauses Laws and Information, Nat’l Conference of State
Legislatures,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/health/pharmacist-conscience-clauses-laws-andinformation.aspx (last updated May 2012); State Policies in Brief, Refusing to Provide Health Services,
Guttmacher Inst. (Aug. 1, 2013), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/ spib_RPHS.pdf.
144. Id.; see Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman, supra note 51, at 114–22.
145. Kim, supra note 134.
146. Id. See Pharmacy Refusals 101, Nat’l Women’s Law Ctr. (Apr. 24, 2012),
http://www.nwlc.org/resource/pharmacy-refusals-101 (“In Milwaukee, Wisconsin, a mother of six went to her
local Walgreens with a prescription for emergency contraception. The pharmacist refused to fill the
prescription and berated the mother in the pharmacy’s crowded waiting area, shouting ‘You’re a murderer! I
will not help you kill this baby . . . .’ She subsequently became pregnant and had an abortion.”).
147. Some people even feel so strongly that all sex is procreative that they think women who are sexually
assaulted should welcome the role of motherhood even if it is—literally—forced up on them. John Avlon,
GOP Policy is the Scandal, Not Just Akin’s Comments, CNN (Aug. 21, 2012),
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/21/opinion/avlon-akin-gop/index.html; Mark Memmott, “God Intended” A
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Whether expressed by a private employer or by a government official,
desexualization is identifiable in the law. When it came to the ACA, we saw
desexualization by public and private actors challenging the mandated
coverage of contraceptives. In terms of emergency contraception, we see
desexualization in the actions of regulatory officials. In both contexts,
desexualization is used to propel women toward motherhood. As a
consequence, women are impliedly told prior to intercourse that sex is only
sanctioned if it is done for the purposes of becoming a parent, thus further
facilitating the legal regulation of sexual and reproductive decisionmaking.

III. The Curious Disappearance of the Pregnant Woman: Using Rituals to
Promote Motherhood148
Motherhood is treated as a “female rite of passage” that marks a woman’s
value and status.149 For a woman, rejecting motherhood is tantamount to
rejecting her core societal role.150 Using contraceptives is counter to the role
women are supposed to play.
Whether a woman seeks to end a pregnancy or to continue it,
desexualization continues through the regulation of women’s sexual and
reproductive health.151 After all, a less-sexual woman may be seen as a better
mother.152 But being pregnant does not necessarily mean that one will become
a “mother,” let alone the good, all-sacrificing mother that society demands.
Manufacturing mothers after conception also requires what this Article calls
ritualization: first, making pregnant women seeking an abortion participate in
the same medical rituals that women continuing pregnancies are directed to
undertake, and second, for women who decide to continue their pregnancy,
using their participation or lack of participation in certain rituals to indicate
whether they will be “good mothers.” Desexualization and ritualization work
in tandem in reproductive health law to cast women as mothers.

Pregnancy Caused by Rape, Indiana Candidate Says, Nat’l Pub. Radio (Oct. 24, 2012, 7:15 AM),
http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/10/24/163529166/god-intended-a-pregnancy-caused-by-rapeindiana-candidate-says. But see Goldstein, supra note 12, at 13 (saying that rape victims may not be expected
to take on the mothering role because they did not consent to having sex).
148. Another area of ritualization is infertility treatment. For an exploration of the relationship between
abortion jurisprudence and assisted reproductive technology, see generally Burkstrand-Reid, The More Things
Change, supra note 68, and Jody Lyneé Madeira, Woman Scorned?: Resurrecting Infertile Women’s DecisionMaking Autonomy, 71 Md. L. Rev. 339 (2012).
149. Martha McMahon, Engendering Motherhood: Identity and Self-Transformation in Women’s Lives
108 (1995).
150. Id. at 231.
151. Robbie E. Davis-Floyd, Birth as an American Rite of Passage 61 (2003).
152. Friedman et al., supra note 66, at 796–99.
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A. Locating and Defining Ritualization
“Good motherhood” is derived from a cultural script telling women how
to be mothers.153 This script requires women to relegate their sexuality to the
periphery.154 Rituals bring women into the norms of pregnancy and
motherhood.155 Women may be coerced into participating in what are typically
treated in continuing pregnancies as bonding rituals associated with “good
motherhood.”156 In the context of abortion, by requiring women to interact
with providers multiple times or see an ultrasound, the law tries to compel
them to accept the role of mother.157 Likewise, women are told by society and
the legal system that to be a “good mother” they must participate in a
medicalized birth and may be legally punished if they do not.158
This Part examines how ritualization underpins the regulation of pregnant
women’s sexual and reproductive health decisionmaking and thus undermines
women’s autonomy once a woman is pregnant.159 Ritualization occurs both in
the context of abortion and in the context of a continuing pregnancy, from
prenatal care to childbirth. In both, we see examples of how Roe and its
progeny have been mobilized to facilitate the State’s purported interest in
“maternal” health and fetal life, which thinly veils how the law pushes women
toward motherhood.160
153. McMahon, supra note 149, at 27.
154. Montemurro & Siefken, supra note 6, at 366; Tardy, supra note 6, at 462–63.
155. Lisa M. Mitchell, Baby’s First Picture: Ultrasound and the Politics of Fetal Subjects 174 (2001);
Geoffrey P. Miller, The Legal Function of Ritual, 80 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 1181, 1181, 1189–90 (2005)
(“Rituals . . . speak to people’s core emotions and reveal values that a society holds dearest. Because their
expression is conventional and obligatory, they join the individual in solidarity with the group. . . . Rituals are
enacted at key transitions in a person’s life when he or she is likely to be receptive to influences on identity.
These transitions include life crises such as . . . pregnancy, parenthood, or death of a loved one. People are
likely to be more receptive to influence in these situations because the circumstances tend to be charged with
emotion and because these are occasions where identities are changing.”).
156. See generally Carol Sanger, Seeing and Believing: Mandatory Ultrasound and the Path to a
Protected Choice, 56 UCLA L. Rev. 351, 382–83 (2008) [hereinafter Sanger, Seeing and Believing]. There are
countless rituals in the medicalized birthing process today. Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 73–153 (listing, for
example, the use of wheelchairs, separation from partners, use of hospital gowns instead of personal clothing,
enemas, hospital beds, and fasting).
157. Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 156, at 382–83.
158. The regulation of aspects of reproductive health is part of the “medicalized . . . need to protect
women.” Ikemoto, The Realignment of Women’s Health, supra note 43, at 752; see infra Part II.B.; Valenti,
supra note 25, at 158–61. The government extensively regulates the behavior of pregnant women when it
comes to drug use. See, e.g., Julie B. Ehrlich, Breaking the Law by Giving Birth: The War on Drugs, the War
on Reproductive Rights, and the War on Women, 32 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 381, 386–92 (2008)
(examining state responses to “the perceived problem of drug use by pregnant women”).
159. Using abortion jurisprudence to directly or implicitly justify intervention in women’s reproductive
lives is a “serious distortion” of Roe. Janet Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What’s Wrong with
Fetal Rights, 10 Harv. Women’s L.J. 9, 15 (1987); see Kim Shayo Buchanan, Lawrence v. Geduldig:
Regulating Women’s Sexuality, 56 Emory L.J. 1235, 1291 (2007) (“[T]he courts of appeals of two circuits
have imported the ‘undue burden’ standard to adjudicate the equal protection rights of pregnant women in
cases that have nothing to do with any countervailing state interest in protecting fetal life.”).
160. Roe is cited in reproductive and sexual health cases outside of the abortion context. See, e.g., Carey v.
Population Control Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 685–90 (1977); Leigh v. Bd. of Registration in Nursing, 506
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The number and type of abortion-related laws are extensive and continue
to increase.161 Some of these laws contain an insidious aspect: they replicate
the rituals of prenatal care but with the goal of stopping women from
exercising their right to have an abortion. Examples of common abortion laws
that both limit access to abortion care and replicate prenatal care are forced
ultrasounds, biased counseling, and mandatory delay laws, which operate
together to ritualize abortion services.
1.

Forced Ultrasounds162

Perhaps the most powerful ritual in a continuing pregnancy is displayed
on a screen and subsequently carried in the pockets and purses of mothers-tobe. This is the ultrasound, the first visual representation of a fetus.163
Ultrasounds have become a rite of passage for a pregnant woman.164 This
prenatal ritual is one of many legal tools that anti-reproductive-rights
advocates use to push women seeking abortions toward motherhood.165
Ultrasound use is virtually unregulated in the United States, and the
research on the safety and efficacy for both the pregnant woman and fetus is
limited.166 Even in a continuing pregnancy, ultrasounds are medically indicated
only in limited circumstances.167 Ultrasounds in a continuing pregnancy can be
used to confirm that the pregnancy is viable, determine the date of gestation
and the number of fetuses, and to determine whether there may be problems
with the fetus.168 During the ultrasound process, women may hear a fetal
heartbeat and may leave their provider’s office with a printout of a bean-sized
image to share with friends and family.169 Despite the popularity of this ritual,
N.E.2d 91, 94 (Mass. 1987); Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1995); Lynn M.
Paltrow & Jeanne Flavin, Arrests of and Forced Interventions on Pregnant Women in the United States, 1973–
2005: Implications for Women’s Legal Status and Public Health, 38 J. Health Pol. Pol’y & L. 299, 325 (2013).
161. States Enact a Record Number of Abortion Restrictions in 2011, Guttmacher Inst. (Jan. 5, 2012),
http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/01/05/endofyear.html.
162. Elective cesarean sections are beyond the scope of this Article. For points of view on this procedure,
see Veronique Bergeron, The Ethics of Cesarean Section on Maternal Request: A Feminist Critique of the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists’ Position on Patient-Choice Surgery, 21 Bioethics 478,
482–84 (2007); Gene Declercq & Judy Norsigian, Mothers Aren’t Behind A Vogue for Caesareans, Boston
Globe
(Apr. 3,
2006),
http://www.boston.com/yourlife/health/women/
articles/2006/04/03/mothers_arent_behind_a_vogue_for_caesareans.
163. Carol Sanger, “The Birth of Death”: Stillborn Birth Certificates and the Problem for Law, 100 Calif.
L. Rev. 269, 282 (2012).
164. Id. at 282.
165. Sanger, supra note 163, at 301–02.
166. Compare, Ina May Gaskin, Ina May’s Guide to Childbirth 191 (2003), with Murkoff & Mazel supra
note 139.
167. Gaskin, supra note 166, at 191. But see Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey,
667 F.3d 570, 579 (5th Cir. 2012) (describing sonograms as “routine measures in pregnancy medicine today”
and “‘medically necessary’ for the mother and fetus”).
168. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 60; Gaskin, supra note 166, at 191.
169. Forming a Bond with Your Baby—Why It isn’t Always Immediate, WebMD (Aug. 2, 2012),
http://www.webmd.com/parenting/baby/forming-a-bond-with-your-baby-why-it-isnt-always-immediate
(“[Bonding] begins to happen even before the baby is bornwhen you feel the first little flutters in your belly
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the ultrasound process and resulting “picture” are misleading; especially early
in pregnancy, it is likely that “the ultrasound image has been magnified and the
heartbeat amplified.”170 Studies show that most couples need help even
interpreting the fetal image.171 So why is that black-and-white printout so
powerful? Quite simply: the act of holding that picture defines the holder as a
parent.172
There are limited medical reasons to require an ultrasound for a firsttrimester abortion.173 Some providers perform ultrasounds voluntarily,
however, while others are forced by law to either perform them or to give
information about them prior to providing an abortion.174 Regardless of
whether the ultrasound is mandated by law or performed at the direction of the
provider, ultrasounds push women toward motherhood.
Some states do not require a provider to perform an ultrasound but
require providers to offer to display the ultrasound screen if one is
performed.175 In some states, the law forces a woman seeking an abortion to
have an ultrasound—regardless of her or the provider’s wishes—and may
require the provider to offer to show the image to the woman.176 State laws
with the most “force” require providers to perform an ultrasound, display the
image, and describe what is on the screen,177 presumably on the patriarchal
assumption that women having an abortion have not thought their choice
through.178
Ultrasound laws are often veiled in medical terms and are described as a
type of “informed consent.”179 Informed consent in medicine, generally, is

or see your baby kick on the ultrasound screen.”); Kukla, supra note 25, at 70–74 (describing ultrasounds as
being “social” events).
170. Caroline Mala Corbin, Compelled Disclosures, Ala. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2014), at *45, available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2258742.
171. Mitchell, supra note 155, at 5.
172. 10 Ways to Bond With Your Bump, Babycentre (last updated Oct. 2011),
http://www.babycentre.co.uk/a1049630/10-ways-to-bond-with-your-bump#ixzz2GwTNBzGD (“Having a
picture of your baby’s scan on your phone or on your fridge door is a constant reminder that your bump is
home to a little person.”).
173. Sarah E. Weber, An Attempt to Legislate Morality: Forced Ultrasounds as the Newest Tactic in AntiAbortion Legislation, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 359, 380 (2009); 2011 Clinical Policy Guidelines, Nat’l Abortion
Fed’n,
at
9–10
(2011),
http://www.prochoice.org/pubs_research/publications/downloads/
professional_education/2011%20CPGs.pdf.
174. State
Policies
in
Brief:
Requirements
for
Ultrasound,
Guttmacher
Inst.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_RFU.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2013).
175. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2317.561 (West 2008); W. Va. Code § 16-2I-2(c) (2010).
176. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-23A-4(b)(4) (2002); Fla. Stat. § 390.0111(3)(a) (2013).
177. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.2(D) (2012). In some circumstances, a woman may opt to
look away or decline to listen. State Policies in Brief, supra note 174.
178. See, e.g., Tex. Med. Providers Performing Abortion Servs. v. Lakey, 667 F.3d 570, 573 (5th Cir.
2012) (providing the title of the Texas anti-abortion and ultrasound statute—the “Woman’s Right to Know
Act”). However, information that “might cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion” does not in and
of itself make a law unconstitutional. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 883 (1992).
179. See, e.g., Tex. Med Providers Performing Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d at 582; La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1299.35.2(D)(2)(d) (requiring women to fill out a form indicating that they’ve been given the opportunity
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designed to be a health protection for patients, but the use of ultrasounds and
the required dialogue surrounding their use prior to abortion is intended to
push women toward motherhood.180 Even if forced ultrasounds are
constitutionally permissible, their purported constitutionality does not make
them any more medically necessary or any less political.181
Mandating ultrasounds in the context of abortion care uses a major ritual
of a continuing pregnancy in an attempt to trigger “maternal” bonding, prompt
“maternal” guilt, and prevent abortion.182 The very process of getting an
ultrasound is part of the ritual of a continuing pregnancy: the cleaning of the
stomach, the movement of the ultrasound wand, lying down on what may feel
like a delivery table, lights dimmed and screen bright.183 It is in similar
circumstances when, later in a continuing pregnancy, women may find out the
sex of the baby and have the first glimpse of fetal body parts and the twists and
turns of the fetus in utero. As such, the law tries to turn them into mothers;
ultrasounds put the pregnant woman in a place very similar to where she might
be in a much later point in pregnancy, one at which, hypothetically, she has
accepted motherhood. It is a thinly “veiled attempt to personify the fetus and
dissuade a woman from obtaining an abortion.”184
2.

Biased Counseling/Informed Consent and Mandatory
Delay/Waiting Periods

While the use of forced ultrasounds may be the most obvious way that a
ritual of continuing pregnancy is used to push women seeking an abortion into
motherhood, ritualization is used in other ways in the context of abortion.
Although more subtle, some counseling and informed consent provisions
regulating abortion also signify ritualization and further thrust women toward
motherhood.185

to see the “unborn child” and listen to a heartbeat); Sonia M. Suter, Bad Mothers or Struggling Mothers?, 42
Rutgers L.J. 695, 700 (2011).
180. Suter, supra note 179, at 700.
181. Tex. Med Providers Performing Abortion Servs., 667 F.3d at 576.
182. Sanger, Seeing and Believing, supra note 156, at 382–83.
183. Mitchell, supra note 155, at 3; Michelle Chen, It’s Not Just Forced Ultrasound: Abortion Rights
Under
Assault,
Salon
(Oct. 21,
2012,
12:00 PM),
http://www.salon.com/2012/10/21/
its_not_just_forced_ultrasound_abortion_rights_under_assault. Furthermore, given the high percentage of
women having abortions who are already mothers, by replicating the ultrasound ritual, the law has compelled
women to experience a significant ritual in “maternal” healthcare and “motherhood,” one which they may be
familiar with as biological mothers. Lauren Sandler, The Mother Majority: Women with Children Have More
Abortions than Anyone Else, and By an Increasingly Wide Margin. So Why is the Topic Taboo?, Slate
(Oct. 17,
2011,
4:34 PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2011/10/most_surprising_abortion_statistic_the_majority_of_
women_who_ter.html.
184. State Policies in Brief, supra note 174.
185. Chinué Turner Richardson & Elizabeth Nash, Misinformed Consent: The Medical Accuracy of StateDeveloped Abortion Counseling Materials, 9 Guttmacher Pol’y Rev. 4 (2006) (“In some cases, the state goes so
far as to include information that is patently inaccurate or incomplete, lending credence to the charge that states’
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The State may express anti-abortion viewpoints by forcing medical
providers to convey information that goes beyond traditional informed consent
requirements.186 Thirty-five states require that women receive some type of
counseling prior to having an abortion; twenty-seven specify what the
information must include, and that information is often biased or inaccurate.187
These laws are often described as “informed consent” laws, a label that
disingenuously implies that they replicate the counseling that takes place
before all medical procedures when, in fact, the information provided goes far
beyond that. This is why pro-choice advocates sometimes call them “biased
counseling” laws.188 For example, South Dakota forces providers to give
misleading information that says having an abortion puts women at increased
risk of committing suicide.189 Wisconsin requires that the materials offered to a
woman include “photographs, pictures or drawings, that are designed to inform
the woman of the probable anatomical and physiological characteristics of the
unborn child at 2-week gestational increments.”190 Some states even provide
inaccurate information on the impact an abortion can have on future fertility191
and the discredited theory that there is a link between abortion and breast
cancer.192
To understand how biased counseling constitutes ritualization at the time
of an abortion, one must first understand how health care is delivered during a

abortion counseling mandates are sometimes intended less to inform women about the abortion procedure than to
discourage them from seeking abortions altogether.”).
186. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882–83 (1992) (“If the information the State
requires to be made available to the woman is truthful and not misleading, the requirement may be
permissible . . .[R]equiring that the woman be informed of the availability of information relating to fetal
development and the assistance available should she decide to carry the pregnancy to full term is a reasonable
measure to ensure an informed choice, one which might cause the woman to choose childbirth over abortion.
This requirement cannot be considered a substantial obstacle to obtaining an abortion, and, it follows, there is
no undue burden.”).
187. State Policies in Brief: Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, Guttmacher Inst.,
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MWPA.pdf (last visited Oct. 6, 2013) [hereinafter
Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion]. Counseling may be oral or written, in person or not. Id; see
Caroline Mala Corbin, The First Amendment Right Against Compelled Listening, 89 B.U. L. Rev. 939, 1000–
11 (2009) (arguing that women have a right to not listen to abortion-related counseling).
188. See
Biased
Counseling
&
Mandatory
Delays,
NARAL
Pro-Choice
Am.,
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/what-is-choice/fast-facts/biased_counseling.html (last visited Oct. 14, 2013)
(defining “biased counseling” and “mandatory delay”); see also Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion,
supra note 187; Ian Vandewalker, Abortion and Informed Consent: How Biased Counseling Laws Mandate
Violations of Medical Ethics, 19 Mich. J. Gender & L. 1, 6–33 (2012).
189. Planned Parenthood Minn., N.D., & S.D. v. Rounds, 686 F.3d 889, 905 (8th Cir. 2012); Spurious
Science Triumphs as U.S. Court Upholds South Dakota “Suicide Advisory” Law, Guttmacher Inst. (July 27,
2012), http://www.guttmacher.org/media/inthenews/2012/07/27/index.html (quoting the American
Psychological Association as saying, “the best scientific evidence indicates that the relative risk of mental
health problems among adult women who have an unplanned pregnancy is no greater if they have an elective
first-trimester abortion than if they deliver the pregnancy”).
190. Wis. Stat. § 253.10 (3)(d)(2) (2012).
191. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 187 (listing Arizona, Kansas, North
Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, and West Virginia).
192. Id. (listing Alaska, Kansas, Mississippi, Oklahoma, and Texas).
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typical pregnancy. In an ideal prenatal care setting, when a woman chooses to
continue a pregnancy, her interaction with a medical professional begins
immediately. In addition to confirming the pregnancy, the first visit typically
involves the taking of a medical history, a physical exam, some laboratory
tests, a lot of talk about what is to come in the next several months, and ways
for the pregnant woman to stay healthy during the pregnancy.193
Biased counseling laws are an attempt to replicate that prominent ritual of
pregnancy: visits to a trusted healthcare provider.194 But abortion “informed
consent” statutes do nothing of the kind; they twist the woman’s medical
confidant into an ideological advocate, whether or not the provider agrees.195
As a consequence, a woman’s trust in her provider is used against her.
Admittedly, when a pregnancy is to be terminated, a woman’s
relationship with the provider is more truncated than the relationships women
have with their providers in an ongoing pregnancy.196 Nonetheless, by
requiring biased counseling, the State pushes healthcare providers to exert
power over a woman seeking to end a pregnancy. The power a practitioner has
over a pregnant woman, whether she is ending or continuing her pregnancy, is
immense197 and is badly misused when counseling is biased, especially when
that provider is forced to provide erroneous health information.198 But biased
counseling is not the only example of ritualization in pregnancy. Mandatory
delay laws, which require time to pass between an initial consultation and the
abortion, also mimic the care provided in a wanted pregnancy.
Monthly visits to a medical provider are one of the rituals of an ongoing
pregnancy.199 The wait between each visit provides time for the pregnant
woman (transformed into a mother) to bond with the fetus and to contemplate
motherhood.200 This process is mirrored to a limited extent by laws that
mandate delay between a woman’s decision to have an abortion and the
procedure itself. In twenty-six states, a woman has to wait one or more days
between the time she seeks an abortion and the time an abortion is performed,

193. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 124–26.
194. Compare id. at 21–32, with La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6(A)(4)(c) (2012).
195. Richardson & Nash, supra note 185.
196. La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40:1299.35.6(A)(4)(c) (“The vast majority of all abortions are performed in
clinics devoted solely to providing abortions and family planning services. Most women who seek abortions at
these facilities do not have any relationship with the physician who performs the abortion, before or after the
procedure. They do not return to the facility for postsurgical care. In most instances, the woman’s only actual
contact with the physician occurs simultaneously with the abortion procedure, with little opportunity to receive
counseling concerning her decision.”).
197. See, e.g., M.C. Shapiro et al., Information Control and the Exercise of Power in the Obstetrical
Encounter, 17 Soc. Sci. Med. 139, 145 (1983).
198. Vandewalker, supra note 188, at 6–33.
199. See generally Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139 (describing monthly prenatal visits).
200. Id. at 29, 248; Sara Terzo, Analysis: Pro-Life Support for Abortion Waiting Periods and Informed
Consent Saves Lives, Live Action News (Jan. 20, 2013), http://liveactionnews.org/pro-life-support-forabortion-waiting-periods-and-informed-consent-saves-lives.
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and several states mandate two visits to the abortion provider.201 A woman
terminating a pregnancy is required to take the time to think about and bond
with her “unborn child,” as if she had not already seriously considered her
decision to have an abortion before going to visit her provider.
Forced ultrasounds, biased counseling, and mandatory delay laws
replicate rituals that take place during the process preceding childbirth for the
purpose of making women accept the role of mother, and thus impede
women’s access to abortion. The information presented to the woman—via
ultrasound, orally, or in writing—is designed to create a hierarchical
relationship with a medical professional who then may be required to provide
information designed to induce women to feel like a mother through these
rituals and create feelings of guilt about choosing not to be a mother. If a
woman does not change her mind, she is rejecting “a five-thousand-year-old
tide of conditioning, of social agendas propounded by churches and other
male-dominated institutions, that say that a woman’s primary purpose is to
have children and to serve her children and her husband.”202
B. The Patient Mother
One might think that once a woman accepts the responsibility of
childbirth, the State would cease to intervene. But “choice” is not just about
abortion. Pregnancy and the birth process are filled with a vast number of
options regarding how birth will take place.203 And the law frequently
influences what choices women make as mothers, as we see through the
ritualized practices in the ongoing pregnancy.
In the context of childbirth, ritualization involves a woman engaging the
rituals of a medicalized pregnancy and birth process, primarily the rituals
involved in standard obstetric care and hospital birthing.204
By ‘medicalizing’ birth, i.e. separating a woman from her own environment
and surrounding her with strange people using strange machines to do
strange things to her in an effort to assist her, the woman’s state of mind and
body is so altered that her way of carrying through this intimate act must also
be altered and the state of the baby born must equally be altered. The result
is that it is no longer possible to know what births would have been like
before these manipulations. Most health care providers no longer know what

201. Counseling and Waiting Periods for Abortion, supra note 187. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 885–87 (1992) (upholding a twenty-four hour waiting period). Although some states
require a mandatory delay of less than twenty-four hours, the practical impact of the delay is likely to make the
woman have to return to the provider the following day.
202. Christiane Northrup, Women’s Bodies, Women’s Wisdom: Creating Physical and Emotional Health
and Healing 388 (2010).
203. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 21–31.
204. This Article asserts that ritualization is reflected in the broader trend of medicalization, the “process
of turning . . . people into patients. . . . It leads people to have too much treatmentand some of them are
harmed by it.” H. Gilbert Welch, Opinion, The Medicalization of Life, L.A. Times (Mar. 15, 2010),
http://articles.latimes.com/2010/mar/15/opinion/la-oe-welch15-2010mar15.
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‘non-medicalized’ birth is. The entire modern obstetric and neonatological
205
literature is essentially based on observations of ‘medicalized’ birth .

Although women can give birth in a variety of settings, they do so
overwhelmingly in hospitals and with physicians, though options for other
birth attendants exist.206 In the United States there is a “veritable mandate” that
babies be born in hospitals—and nearly all are.207 This is due, in part, to the
increasing number of medical technologies that are presented as necessary for
a safe labor process: fetal monitors and intravenous medicines, among other
interventions, are part of the birth ritual.208 Given all of the technology now
available for use during the labor process, its use is expected; women who
refuse modern locations, modern interventions, or who forsake “scientific”
(that is physician) advice risk being seen as selfish, the hallmark of a “bad
mother.”209
Some degree of medicalization within the narrow relationship between a
pregnant woman and her practitioner is expected. But our legal regime may go
above and beyond the typical provider-patient relationship by dictating where,
how, and with whom women may labor.210 Why do we see ritualization in the
law and social dictates regarding what constitutes a good pregnancy and
birth?211 Is it a symptom of industrialization and our societal obsession with
new technologies?212 Is it a sign not only of State intervention but also our
lawsuit-happy society, with doctors choosing to intervene rather than assume
legal risk?213 Or might the State’s push to use the rituals of medicalized birth
reflect a distrust of women’s reproductive capacity, a view “of the female body
as an inherently defective machine?”214 The answer is unknown.

205. M. Wagner, Fish Can’t See Water: The Need to Humanize Birth, 75 Int’l J. Gynecology & Obstetrics
S25, S26 (2001) (quoting the European Reg’l Office, World Health Org., Having a Baby in Europe (1985)).
206. Joyce A. Martin et al., Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., Births: Final Data for 2011, 62 Nat’l Vital
Statistics Reports 1, 12 (2013).
207. Heather Joy Baker, “We Don’t Want to Scare the Ladies:” An Investigation of Maternal Rights and
Informed Consent Throughout the Birth Process, 31 Women’s Rights L. Rep. 538, 553 (2010); see supra note
206.
208. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 362–99.
209. See Kukla, supra note 25, at 74 (discussing “birth as a maternal achievement test”); Baker, supra note
207, at 553. See generally Susan Goldberg, Medical Choices During Pregnancy: Whose Decision is it Anyway?,
41 Rutgers L. Rev. 591 (1989) (discussing efforts to compel pregnant women to undergo treatments against their
wishes). Blaming the woman for all ills that befall her baby is not new; for example, people used to believe that “if
you looked at ugly things, you’d have an ugly baby.” Tara Parker-Pope, Lessons from the History of Childbirth,
N.Y. Times (Well) (Feb. 5, 2010, 10:28 AM), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/the-history-of-childbirth.
For a discussion of the “bad mother” in law, see generally Marie Ashe, The “Bad Mother” In Law and Literature:
A Problem of Representation, 43 Hastings L.J. 1017 (1992).
210. The tort system may impact obstetrical practice. Sheila Kitzinger, The Complete Book of Pregnancy
& Childbirth 56 (2011); Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 48.
211. Jennifer Block, Pushed: The Painful Truth About Childbirth and Modern Maternity Care 6 (2007);
Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 48.
212. Block, supra note 211, at 6, 39–40.
213. Id. at 43; Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 48.
214. Davis-Floyd, supra note 151, at 72.
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The State controls pregnancy and labor by propelling pregnant women
toward a birth marked by a standard set of medical rituals. Specifically, it
adopts laws and allows legal interventions that (1) limit what type of medical
professional can attend childbirth, (2) limit the locations of birth labor, and
(3) limit the methods women use to give birth. All of these exemplify how
women are expected to participate in the ritualization of pregnancy, the
propulsion of those women toward “good motherhood,” and the consequences
to women who do not participate in these rituals.215
1.

Attending Birth

Among the most important decisions a woman approaching childbirth can
make is the choice of who, if anyone, will provide medical attention to her and
the child at birth. This choice is circumscribed by legal restrictions limiting the
number of acceptable choices available to a “good mother.”
In medicalized birth the doctor is always in control while the key element in
humanized birth is the woman in control of her own birthing and whatever
happens to her. No patient has ever been in complete control in the
hospital—if a patient disagrees with the hospital management and has failed
in attempts to negotiate the care, her only option is to sign herself out of the
hospital. Giving women choice about certain maternity care procedures is
not giving up control since doctors [decide] what choices women will be
given and doctors still have the power to decide whether or not they will
216
acquiesce to a woman’s choice.

More than eighty-six percent of all hospital births are attended by
physicians, who are often criticized as being proponents of medicalized
birth.217 A recent trend in birth choice in the United States is to eschew the
services of a physician and use alternative providers—midwives—to facilitate
a kinder, more gentle birth.218 There are several types of midwives, and each
has different legal status, degree of legal regulation, educational requirements,
and type of organization.219 Even though many Certified Nurse Midwives, one
type of midwife, practice in hospitals,220 they are seen by some as a viable
alternative to the medicalization of birth.221 Still, many fewer hospital births
are attended by midwives as compared with physicians,222 even though studies
215. The treatment of pregnant women may vary depending upon the pregnant woman’s social status.
Michele Goodwin, Prosecuting the Womb, 76 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1657, 1661–64 (2008) (outlining the
discriminatory application of drug-related laws to pregnant women).
216. Wagner, supra note 205, at S26.
217. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12; Block, supra note 211, at 263.
218. This is not to say that all physicians subscribe to a medicalized view of birth, or that all midwives do
not. Gaskin, supra note 166, at 305–07.
219. For detailed information on the types of midwives, see Comparison of Certified Nurse-Midwives,
Certified Midwives, and Certified Professional Midwives, Am. Coll. of Nurse-Midwives (Mar. 2011).
220. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12–13.
221. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 24–25; Gaskin, supra note 166, at 305–07; Rebecca A. Spence,
Abandoning Women to Their Rights: What Happens When Feminist Jurisprudence Ignores Birthing Rights, 19
Cardozo. J.L. & Gender 75, 93 (2012).
222. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12.
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suggest that births attended by midwives (as well as births at home) are as safe
as or safer than physician-assisted births for women with uncomplicated
pregnancies.223 But midwives face a patchwork of legal regulations.224
In midwifery-related jurisprudence, Roe has been used by courts as both
sword and shield against pregnant women. For example, one court wrote that
Roe and its progeny provide no privacy protection for women wanting
midwives, thus limiting access to such providers: “The right to privacy which
protects a woman’s choice to have an abortion has never been interpreted to
guarantee a woman the right to choose the manner and circumstances in which
her baby is born.”225 Another court used Roe to find a legitimate state interest
in regulating midwifery and limiting access to midwives.226 Thus, once the
woman has had sex that leads to procreation, ritualization of birth seals the
deal: as a mother-to-be she is desexualized and pregnancy and birth rituals
further entrench her in her socially and legally defined role as a mother.
As discussed previously, Roe’s applicability to women’s health issues
outside of the abortion context—including midwifery—is questionable. This
is, in part, because it is unclear what parts of Roe are essential holdings and
what parts are dicta.227 Roe states that it is permissible to regulate the
qualifications of the abortion provider, the location of the procedure, and the
applicable licensing requirements, but this approval is given in the context of
abortion services, and it does not speak to any extension of the holding outside
of that factual context.228 Nonetheless, some in the midwifery community
appear to concede that an expansive reading of Roe supports arguments to
curtail or regulate midwifery.229

223. Christopher Rausch, The Midwife and the Forceps: The Wild Terrain of Midwifery Law in the United
States and Where North Dakota is Heading in the Birthing Debate, 84 N.D. L. Rev. 219, 227–30 (2008).
224. For detailed information, see Comparison of Certified Nurse-Midwives, Certified Midwives, and
Certified Professional Midwives, supra note 219. Additionally, midwives may have difficulty with insurance
reimbursement, finding physicians willing to supervise their practice, or getting hospital privileges. Susan
Corcoran, To Become a Midwife: Reducing Legal Barriers to Entry into the Midwifery Profession, 80 Wash.
U. L.Q. 649, 651 (2002).
225. Leigh v. Bd. of Registration in Nursing, 506 N.E.2d 91, 94 (Mass. 1987).
226. Sammon v. N.J. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 66 F.3d 639, 646 (3d Cir. 1995).
227. See Randy Beck, Self-Conscious Dicta: The Origins of Roe v. Wade’s Trimester Framework, 51 Am.
J. Legal History 505, 506–08 (2011).
228. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973).
229. One person in the midwifery community said that “[i]n short, if a state can require persons
performing abortions to be licensed doctors, then a state can require that persons assisting births be licensed
doctors, nurses or midwives as well. This is why midwifery proponents should never argue that Roe v. Wade
supports a mother’s right to choose her manner and place of giving birth. . . . Because midwifery involves the
birth of a child after viability, assisted by a nonphysician, Roe v. Wade is not good precedent for a privacy
argument.” Erik L. Smith, Midwifery and the Constitution, 65 Midwifery Today 33, 35 (2003). For an
examination of Roe’s impact in other non-abortion contexts, see generally Susan Behuniak-Long, Roe v.
Wade: The Impact of An Outdated Decision on Reproductive Technologies, 8 Pol’y Studies Rev. 368 (1989).
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Restrictions on midwifery are based on the ritualized treatment of labor as
a medical condition.230 As in abortion jurisprudence, even before birth, women
are treated as mothers whose first priority is their baby, not as women who can
make autonomous healthcare decisions.231 Legal barriers to midwifery have the
attendant consequence of driving women into the traditional healthcare system,
where technology is omnipresent and where “good mothers” take advantage of
it.232 These medicalized rituals are a welcome aspect of birth for some women,
yet for those who seek an alternative path to childbirth, even one that has been
shown to be safe for mother and fetus, rejection of prescribed rituals opens the
door to further legal limits on reproductive autonomy, such as where the birth
can take place and what type of birth—vaginal or cesarean—will occur.
2.

Locating Birth

The location of birth is closely linked to who attends birth.233 Again, the
location of birth triggers the State’s interest in “maternal” health as
conceptualized in abortion regulation and, thus, ritualization is present. And
again, this regulation of “motherhood” takes place before a woman actually
becomes a mother.
Although nearly one hundred percent of births took place in a hospital in
2011,234 not all women want hospital births; some women seek to give birth at
a birthing center or even at home. Birthing centers are typically locations
where women are often attended by midwives in a setting that is less
medicalized than hospitals.235 Home birth is controversial; a 2012 study goes
as far as to propose that countries should establish home birth support, as
“there is no strong evidence . . . to favour either planned hospital birth or
planned home birth for low-risk pregnant women.”236 But the legal
ramifications of giving birth at home can be dramatic for both the pregnant
woman and any medical professional who may help her.237
230. Marsden Wagner, Born in the USA: How a Broken Maternity System Must Be Fixed to Put Mothers
and Infants First 108 (2006); Laura D. Hermer, Midwifery: Strategies on the Road to Universal Legalization,
13 Health Matrix 325, 330–32, 367 (2003).
231. Lynn M. Paltrow, Missed Opportunities in McCorvey v. Hill: The Limits of Pro-Choice Lawyering,
35 N.Y.U. Rev. L. & Soc. Change 194, 221–22 (2011) (discussing the lack of concern in the law for the regret
and emotion women feel when their labor and birth choices are not respected).
232. Kiki Zeldes & Judy Norsigian, Encouraging Women to Consider a Less Medicalized Approach to
Childbirth Without Turning Them Off: Challenges to Producing Our Bodies, Ourselves: Pregnancy and Birth,
35 Birth 245, 249 (2008).
233. See Spence, supra note 221, at 92–93 (“Reproductive justice demands that all pregnant people have
an equal opportunity to make and exercise decisions about their care, including out-of-hospital birth. While no
state regulates the location where a woman must give birth, all states have the power to license and regulate
health professionals who attend birth as a component of state police power.”).
234. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 12.
235. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 23.
236. Ole Olsen & Jette A. Clausen, Planned Hospital Birth Versus Planned Home Birth (Review),
Cochrane Library, Sept. 2012, at 1, 15.
237. Anna Hickman, Born (Not So) Free: Legal Limits on the Practice of Unassisted Childbirth or
Freebirthing in the United States, 94 Minn L. Rev. 1651, 1653–54 (2010); NFOM Frequently Asked
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Birth outside of hospitals is constrained.238 For example, there is a
significant economic barrier for women wanting home birth; even
professionals who can attend such births legally are often not covered by
private insurance, forcing the costs onto the pregnant woman.239 Moreover,
women can be prosecuted for their birth choice, the ultimate retribution for
rejecting the traditional ritualization of birth, and some of these cases cite Roe
in their analyses of women’s reproductive rights in the context of home
birth.240 Whether one agrees with the pregnant woman’s decision or not, at a
minimum, the very existence of criminal prosecution may have a chilling
effect on this form of non-medicalized childbirth, limiting a woman’s choices.
This may have the consequence of solidifying the ritual of the hospital birth.
The regulation of midwives and birth locations goes much further than
the women’s health regulation contemplated in Roe: by the point of labor, the
woman has already accepted her maternal role and the inevitability of birth is
no longer a concern. Still, the State influences pregnant women’s choices
regarding how a pregnancy should progress and thus dictates whether a
pregnant woman is acting as a “good mother” when she makes those
choices.241
The relationship between laws related to midwifery, home birth, and labor
regulates women’s birth choices and serves to promote a certain ritualized
form of childbirth, regardless of a woman’s choices: a medicalized birth. At
the point of birth, women are heavily invested in the management of their own
birth process, hence the emergence of so-called birth plans in which women
express in writing their desires regarding how, where, and with whom
childbirth is to proceed, the ultimate expression of reproductive
management.242 Yet despite these private documents, purported State interests
may trump a woman’s desires. When the regulations concerning where and
with whom birth may occur are read together, it appears that the State is
invested in the ritualization of a medicalized birth, just as it was invested in a
Questions, Neb. Friends of Midwives, http://nefriendsofmidwives.weebly.com/ faqs.html#abouthomebirth (last
visited Oct. 6, 2013) (stating that Nebraska Certified Nurse Midwives who attend a home birth purposefully
may be guilty of a felony).
238. Regulations governing licensure impact women’s ability to labor at home. Home-Birth Advocates
Push for Change in Laws, NBC News (Jan. 28, 2009), http://www.nbcnews.com/ id/28901624/ns/healthwomens_health/t/home-birth-advocates-push-change-laws/#.T6vcSK75878; Hickman, supra note 237, at
1658; Stacey A. Tovino, American Midwifery Litigation and State Legislative Preferences for PhysicianControlled Childbirth, 11 Cardozo Women’s L.J. 61, 70 (2004). For example, many nurse-midwives must be
supervised by physicians, who often will not supervise home births for liability reasons.
239. Home-Birth Advocates Push for Change in Laws, supra note 238.
240. Commonwealth v. Pugh, 969 N.E.2d 672, 676 (Mass. 2012) (reversing conviction of woman for
involuntary manslaughter, discussing “whether a woman in the midst of unassisted [home] childbirth may be
held criminally responsible for . . . ‘inflicting fatal injuries on a viable and near full term fetus during the
birthing process’”); United States v. Jumper, 3 Fed App’x 141, 147 (4th Cir. 2001) (saying, in the context of
an involuntary manslaughter conviction, “[t]he evidence fairly supports the inference that Jumper knew that
the health and life of her child were endangered by her decision to give birth at home without any aid”).
241. Paltrow, supra note 16.
242. Murkoff & Mazel, supra note 139, at 294–97.
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ritualized abortion process. But ritualization goes further—all the way to labor
and delivery, which, if medical orders are not followed, may result in courtordered medical intervention.
3.

Accomplishing Birth

In some circumstances, labor does not culminate in vaginal birth; rather, a
baby may be born by cesarean section, a procedure by which the baby is
removed from the woman via an incision into her uterus.243 Once uncommon,
the percentage of cesareans in the United States was almost thirty-three percent
in 2011,244 more than double the estimated maximum safe percentage of
cesarean births set by the World Health Organization and United States health
agencies; many cesarean sections, therefore, are likely unnecessary.245
Cesarean sections are not without risk: many minor complications, such as
infection, are possible and, most significantly, cesarean birth presents higher
maternal death rates than vaginal delivery.246
Cesarean sections are becoming a cornerstone of ritualized birth: not
having one can exemplify bad “motherhood.”
As long as she has formally consented to Cesarean surgery, the case is
assumed to be an easy one: her decision should be effectuated. When she has
refused, however, the question becomes whether the state can override that
choice. Conventional legal analyses thus pose questions such as: 1) Does the
right to decide whether to procreate necessarily imply a right to decide how
to procreate?; 2) Does the state’s interest in the life and health of a full-term
fetus outweigh the woman’s right to refuse medical treatment?; 3) Does the
duty of a parent to rescue a child in danger extend to a mother carrying a
full-term fetus? Does it apply even when the rescue involves a risk of death
247
to the mother?

Discussing what type of birth constitutes ritualization is complex.
Certainly the high rate of cesarean sections suggests that, increasingly, the
correct ritual in terms of medicalization and being a “good mother” may be a
cesarean section in some circumstances. Legal decisions have made clear that
in some cases, the State thinks “mother” does not know best when it comes to
birth choice. In the context of abortion, for example, the Casey Court says,
“[n]or can it be doubted that most women considering an abortion would deem
the impact on the fetus relevant, if not dispositive, to the decision.”248 Imagine,
then, any court’s reaction to a mother-to-be deciding against having a cesarean
section when told to have one by a medical professional.

243. Our Bodies, Ourselves, supra note 102, at 424–27.
244. Martin et al., supra note 206, at 13.
245. Denise Grady, Caesarean Births Are at a High in the U.S., N.Y. Times (Mar. 23, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/24birth.html.
246. Gaskin, supra note 166, at 288–89.
247. Ehrenreich, supra note 37, at 497.
248. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 882 (1992).
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In several cases, laboring or critically ill women have been forced to have
a cesarean section by court order. In one example, a pregnant woman was
forcibly restrained and drugged under the watch of a horrified partner when
she refused a cesarean section in favor of a vaginal delivery.249 Other women
have gone into hiding to avoid State-compelled cesarean sections,250 and
refusal to have a cesarean, even when the child is subsequently born healthy,
has been considered in abuse and neglect proceedings.251
In compelled cesarean section cases, the law that is supposed to protect
women’s reproductive choices, at least in the context of abortion, Roe, may
actually be used against women when they choose a birth strategy that is
contrary to the provider’s suggestions.252 Again, on its surface, Roe’s
simultaneous interest in “maternal” health and fetal life may seem applicable in
situations where a court forces a woman to have a cesarean section—especially
given the proximity of the woman to motherhood. Seemingly, if a woman
aborting a fetus is “maternal” in Roe, so too would be a woman approaching
birth. However, courts forcing women to have cesarean sections use Roe to
amplify the woman’s function as mother and the necessity of State intervention
because of her failure to assume a maternal role for the benefit of the fetus.253
Whether sex was initially for pleasure or procreation, once pregnant, the
woman is viewed as a mother and is expected to participate in the rituals
surrounding that role accordingly. That is what a “good mother” does.
The expanded use of cesarean sections exemplifies shifts in how society
sees childbirth, shifts that can “evolve into normalized practices, not only
normalizing the obstetrical interventions but also their underlying assumptions
about women’s emotional and physiological insufficiency in labor and
delivery.”254 So, in the context of forced cesarean sections, the law may not
only reflect judgments of the labor-related decisions women make, but also the
physical capacity of women to labor without paternalistic direction from the
State.

IV. The Future of Women’s Health Regulation?
Desexualization and ritualization have served both as signals and,
arguably, tools of State intervention in women’s health, but how might

249. See, e.g., Marguerite A. Driessen, Avoiding the Melissa Rowland Dilemma: Why Disobeying a
Doctor Should Not Be A Crime, 10 Mich. St. U. J. Med. & L. 1, 35–37 (2006) (describing the compelled
cesarean section of a Nigerian woman, whose husband later killed himself).
250. Charity Scott, Resisting The Temptation to Turn Medical Recommendations into Judicial Orders: A
Reconsideration of Court-Ordered Surgery for Pregnant Women, 10 Ga. St. U. L. Rev. 615, 674 (1994).
251. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. V.M., 974 A.2d 448, 449–52 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2009).
252. Paltrow & Flavin, supra note 160, at 325.
253. Id. Another argument is that the State interest in maternal health is so strong that it overwhelms the
woman’s interest in autonomy. This, however, is not borne out in case law, which focuses on fetal health. See
generally Burkstrand-Reid, The Invisible Woman, supra note 51 (discussing the minimization of the health
risks of cesarean sections).
254. Bergeron, supra note 162, at 486.
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desexualization and ritualization be used in the future? To an extent, these
concepts rely on one another to function. While desexualization is the means
by which sex is defined as solely procreative, ritualization further redefines the
woman who took part in sex as a mother by treating her as one, regardless of
whether she intends to carry the pregnancy to term. A woman’s choice to have
sex for pleasure can be devalued via desexualization, and that disapproval may
be reinforced via ritualization or a woman can be subjected to ritualization as a
means of devaluing her sexual choices.
Reproductive health choices in the areas of contraception, abortion,
pregnancy, and birth suggest that accepting even a constructive State interest in
women’s reproductive health may come with a cost: the loss of autonomy
concerning personal health decisionmaking. That cost may increase as State
intervention increases. For example, given the State’s ostensible efforts to
“protect” maternal health at present, might the next step be to protect potential
maternal health and to intervene more aggressively in women’s sexual choices
earlier in or prior to pregnancy?255 If so, desexualization and ritualization in
reproductive health law may boost any effort to “protect” women’s health,
which emphasizes why protections should be carefully scrutinized.
Nonetheless, women need the law to recognize the inherent importance of
women’s health but must also deal with the negative consequences of what that
recognition can mean for their autonomy.256
A. Desexualization and Ritualization Going Forward
Whether desexualization and ritualization are tools affirmatively used to
manufacture mothers or to simply serve as signals that state involvement in
women’s health is present, they raise an important question: to what extent do
we want the State to be involved in regulating, or protecting, women’s health
generally and women’s reproductive health specifically? Two examples of the
potential application of desexualization and ritualization, one in the context of
contraception regulation and a second in the context of abortion legislation,
show that the answer to this question is not obvious.
Contraception is one example of an area of reproductive health regulation
in which we may see more desexualization and ritualization. As previously
discussed, current controversies surrounding contraceptive coverage and
emergency contraceptives show that expanding the availability of
contraceptives is a political landmine. For example, future legislation might
seek to force women to read and sign a state-authored “informed consent”

255. Although not discussed in this Article, conceptualizing women’s health as maternal health may also
impact women’s rights in relation to assisted reproductive technology. See generally Burkstrand-Reid, The
More Things Change, supra note 68; Jack M. Balkin, How New Genetic Technologies Will Transform Roe v.
Wade, 56 Emory L.J. 843 (2007).
256. See infra Part IV.B.
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document akin to those used in the context of abortion257 at the time they
receive contraceptives—emergency or otherwise. Documentation could appear
on a receipt or even the electronic keypad when you swipe your card at
checkout.258 Such a regulation would be yet another way to desexualize
women who have sex for pleasure by putting them through a ritual of
motherhood in the form of a pseudo-medical “consultation” via the reading of
state-authorized “medical” information. Moreover, such a law would mirror
ones already approved by courts in the context of abortion.259 But dismissing
the utility of such a regulation out of hand may ignore a hypothetical benefit.
Certainly adding an informed consent requirement could, if the information
was accurate and apolitical, protect women’s health to some limited extent by
informing women as to the safety and efficacy of the medication.260 However,
the implication of forcing a woman to read such “informed consent”-type
information is that a woman would not otherwise read about the medication or
consider the risks inherent in taking such medication.
As the contraception hypothetical shows, legal intervention in women’s
health has costs, such as the loss of autonomy, and potential benefits, such as
the provision of medical knowledge, if executed apolitically. Thus,
desexualization and ritualization may not necessarily be harmful in every
context. At a minimum, however, their presence should counsel further
consideration of how a law with them operates.
The presence of both the benefits and detriments of desexualization and
ritualization are also seen in the context of abortion. Prior to Gonzales,
reproductive rights jurisprudence mandated exceptions to abortion restrictions
when a pregnant woman’s life or health was in danger, but the status of the
health requirement is now uncertain.261 Since Gonzales, activists have decried
the shrinking of so-called “health exceptions” in abortion law.262 Efforts to
reinvigorate them, however, may come with both benefits and costs.

257. See, e.g., Ga. Code Ann. § 31-9A-3 to -4 (2013); Miss. Code Ann. §§ 41-41-33, -35 (2013); Kan.
Stat. Ann. § 65-6709 (2013); see also supra note 187.
258. This is not to say that such a law would meet regulatory or constitutional requirements. See, e.g.,
John Schwartz, Oklahoma Judge Blocks Law Limiting Morning-After Birth Control, N.Y. Times, Aug. 19,
2013, at A11.
259. See supra Part III.A.2.
260. Our Bodies, Ourselves, supra note 102, at 226 (saying that birth control pills increase the risk of
blood clots, and outlining which women should not use the pill); see Plan B One-Step Product Leaflet, What
You Need to Know (package insert listing possible side effects including changes in menstruation, abdominal
pain, and nausea). Emergency contraceptives in particular are safe under most circumstances. Id. at 251–53
(noting that some medications may interfere with some emergency contraceptives).
261. B. Jessie Hill, A Radically Immodest Judicial Modesty: The End of Facial Challenges to Abortion
Regulations and the Future of the Health Exception in the Roberts Era, 59 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 997, 1018–19
(2009) (noting that the decisions in Ayotte and Gonzales “effectively re-opened the issue of the meaning and
scope of the health exception requirement”).
262. See, e.g., Abortion Bans Without Exceptions Endanger Women’s Health, NARAL Pro-Choice Am.
(Jan. 1, 2012), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-bans-no-exceptions-endangerwomen.pdf.
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Recently, controversy has arisen over abortion bans passed under the
guise of preventing “fetal pain” during an abortion procedure: these laws are
often called “Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection” acts.263 Fetal pain bans
dramatically restrict abortion at and after the twentieth week post-fertilization
and contain extremely circumscribed exceptions for women’s health;264 this
effort “indefensibly jeopardizes” women’s health, according the American
College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American Congress of
Obstetricians and Gynecologists.265 Courts have struck down some fetal painbased bans, but they remain in effect in several states.266
Desexualization and ritualization are present in fetal-pain-based abortion
bans. Women are turned into mothers by virtue of the fact that they are
pregnant (ostensibly proving that sex was for procreation), they have carried
the pregnancy for a long period of time, and, when they want to terminate the
pregnancy, they are expected to subrogate their own health needs for the needs
of the fetus.267
Fetal-pain-based bans are a prime example of the law’s eroding protection
of women’s health.268 The American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists and the American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists
decried one fetal pain based-ban as “fail[ing] entirely to protect women for
whom pregnancy poses serious health risks.”269 Certainly, the lack of adequate
health exceptions in these laws has been a call-to-arms for pro-choice
263. See, e.g., Ala. Code § 26-23B-1 (2013); Idaho Code Ann. § 18-501 (2013); La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1299.30.1 (2013); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 28-3,106 (2013); Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 1-745.1 (2013). For an example
of legislative statements related to fetal pain, see Kan. Stat. Ann. § 65-6722-6724 (2011) (“(a) Pain receptors
(nociceptors) are present throughout the unborn child’s entire body by no later than 16 weeks after fertilization
and nerves link these receptors to the brain’s thalamus and subcortical plate by no later than 20 weeks; (b) by
eight weeks after fertilization, the unborn child reacts to touch. By 20 weeks after fertilization, the unborn
child reacts to stimuli that would be recognized as painful if applied to an adult human, for example, by
recoiling.”); see State Policies on Later Abortions, Guttmacher Inst. (Aug. 1, 2013),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_PLTA.pdf (listing twenty-week bans and fetal pain-based
bans, and defining fetal pain bans as “based on the assertion that the fetus can feel pain at 18 or 20 weeks
postfertilization”).
264. Twenty weeks post-fertilization is the equivalent of twenty-two weeks after the woman’s last
menstrual period. State Policies on Later Abortions, supra note 263. For an example of a fetal pain ban health
exception, see Okla. Stat. tit. 63 § 1-745.5 (prohibiting the performance of an abortion if “the probable
postfertilization age of the woman’s unborn child is twenty (20) or more weeks, unless, in reasonable medical
judgment, she has a condition which so complicates her medical condition as to necessitate the abortion of her
pregnancy to avert her death or to avert serious risk of substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a
major bodily function, not including psychological or emotional conditions. No such condition shall be
deemed to exist if it is based on a claim or diagnosis that the woman will engage in conduct which she intends
to result in her death or in substantial and irreversible physical impairment of a major bodily function”).
265. Brief for Amici Curiae Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and Am. Cong. of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists in support of Appellants and Reversal, Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013)
(No. 12-16670), 2012, at 13 [hereinafter ACOG Amicus].
266. See, e.g., Isaacson v. Horne, 716 F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 2013); McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp.
2d 1128 (D. Idaho 2013); State Policies on Later Abortions, supra note 263.
267. State Policies on Later Abortions, supra note 263; ACOG Amicus, supra note 265, at 8–14.
268. ACOG Amicus, supra note 265, at 14–16.
269. Id. at 8.
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advocates.270 The situations of women seeking an abortion at and after twenty
weeks suggests that, when it comes to women’s health, these laws should be
revisited to allow these abortions under a broader set of health-related
circumstances.271 But fetal pain bans demonstrate something else: in addition
to focusing on the fetus, “protecting” women’s health is used by states to
justify reproductive health regulations when the true legislative goal is to
restrict women’s reproductive rights.272 Case in point: the argument made in
one case that later-term abortions pose greater health risks to pregnant women
than do earlier abortions, thereby justifying the ban.273 These types of
arguments are disingenuous at best.274 Every complication associated with
abortion is more common in women carrying a pregnancy to term and giving
birth: a “woman’s risk of death associated with childbirth was approximately
14 times higher than that associated with abortion.”275 The State’s purported
interest in women’s health was mobilized against women, not for them.
While health exceptions to abortion regulations have generally been seen
as provisions that protect women, the ritualization and desexualization present
in a wide area of women’s reproductive health law suggest that a broader
health exception may also lead to further government assertions of a State
interest in “health” in non-abortion contexts. Including a mental-health based
health exception, for example, would require a definition of “mental health”
which could be exported to other, non-abortion law and used to truncate
women’s rights to make their own decisions later in pregnancy or even in nonreproductive-health contexts. Health protection may come with a price. It may
very well be a price worth paying, but that decision should take into account the
history of health protection and current law and politics before it is made.
B. Abandoning the State’s Purported Interest in Reproductive Health
When it comes to legal regulation related to women’s reproductive health,
women are in the quintessential double-bind.276 Most people would agree that

270. See, e.g., Press Release, Ctr. For Reprod. Rights, House Subcommittee Amends Federal Legislation
to Ban Abortion at 20 Weeks Nationwide, (June 4, 2013), available at http://reproductiverights.org/en/pressroom/house-subcommittee-amends-federal-legislation-to-ban-abortion-at-20-weeks-nationwide (“We urge the
members of the House Judiciary Committee to respect the Constitution and defend women’s health and rights
by rejecting this harmful and misguided bill.”).
271. A few fetal pain based laws do include limited exceptions. See, e.g., La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 40:1299.30.1 (2013) (allowing abortion for “medically futile” pregnancies); Ark. Code Ann. § 20-16-1305
(2013) (listing an exception for rape or incest).
272. McCormack v. Hiedeman, 900 F. Supp. 2d 1128, 1150 (D. Idaho 2013) (refusing to give credence to
the argument that the ban was enacted to preserve women’s health and citing the title of the legislation in
question, the “Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act”).
273. ACOG Amicus, supra note 265, at 14–16 (noting that abortion is “far safer than the only available
alternative—i.e., carrying a pregnancy to term and giving birth”).
274. Id.; McCormack, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 1150.
275. ACOG Amicus, supra note 265, at 14–16.
276. Martha Chamallas, Introduction to Feminist Legal Theory 10–11 (3d ed. 2013); Chamallas, supra
note 60, at 862 (“The feminists’ twin focus on freedom and equality means that no one legal stance—
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the real issue is not whether the State should take any action to protect
women’s health. For example, few would argue that more work is not needed
to lower maternal mortality. Pregnant women are at an especially high risk in
the United States as compared with the rest of the developed world:277
Amnesty International calls the United States’ maternal mortality rate
“shocking.”278 Nonetheless, maternal fetal health funding is under attack.279
The issue is not whether but how and when the State should act.
Neither wholesale acceptance of State intervention in women’s health nor
the wholesale rejection of State intervention in women’s bodies comes without
a cost.280 Calling on the State to protect women means that laws and
jurisprudence will contain language that allows them to do so, and, as this
Article shows, language that “protects” women’s health can be used by the
state to intervene in their ability to make autonomous health decisions.
Desexualization and ritualization can both signify and propel this problem. The
goal, then, should be to develop health regulations that are designed to
maximize health outcomes with a minimal degree of legal interference and
avoid the legal manufacturing of mothers through desexualization,
ritualization, or both.
One way for the State to improve women’s health during their
reproductive years is to abandon desexualization and recognize that women are
entitled to have sex for pleasure. By abandoning desexualization, the State can
improve the availability and use of contraceptives, for example, which is only
part of a larger legal regime that protects the ability of women to make real
choices about whether and when to have children. Increased availability of
contraceptives will both benefit women’s health and save the government
money by preventing unplanned pregnancies.281

interventionist or noninterventionist—can ever be presumptively correct without careful analysis of the power
relationships at play in a particular regulatory context.”).
277. Mark Duell, America Has Worst Maternal Death Rate of Any Industrialized Nation, Claims Shocking
Study, Mail Online (May 5, 2011), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/health/article-1383244/America-worstmaternal-death-rate-industrialised-nation.html.
278. USA Urged to Confront Shocking Maternal Mortality Rate, Amnesty Int’l. (Mar. 12, 2010),
http://www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/usa-urged-confront-shocking-maternal-mortality-rate-2010-0312.
279. News Release, Am. Congress of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, Maternal and Child Health
Advocates Decry Impact of Proposed Budget Cuts, (May 22, 2013), available at
http://www.acog.org/About%20ACOG/News%20Room/News%20Releases/2013/Maternal%20and%20Child%2
0Health%20Advocates%20Decry%20Impact%20of%20Proposed%20Budget%20Cuts.aspx (“The American
Academy of Pediatrics (AAP), American Congress of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (ACOG), Association
of Maternal & Child Health Programs (AMCHP), March of Dimes and the National WIC Association (NWA)
stand in strong unified opposition to the House Appropriations Committee’s FY 2014 allocations and urge
Congress to invest in maternal and child health programs in the next fiscal year and beyond.”).
280. West, supra note 41, at 1394; Frances Kissling, Opinion, Abortion Rights are Under Attack, and ProChoice Advocates are Caught in a Time Warp, Wash. Post. (Feb. 18, 2011),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021802434.html.
281. Guttmacher Inst., In Brief: Fact Sheet, Facts on Unintended Pregnancy in the United States 3 (2012)
http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/FB-Unintended-Pregnancy-US.html (estimating that in 2006, expenditures
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Abandoning ritualization in a continuing pregnancy also holds promise
for improving health outcomes because doing so would require abandoning
laws that nominally, at best, protect women’s health but diminish their
reproductive choices. In the context of abortion services, abandoning
ritualization would require major changes in the way we view abortion,
moving it from a shameful act of maternal avoidance to an act of reproductive
health management. Moving away from medical rituals in abortion care and
diversifying birth choices in continuing pregnancies may actually improve
health outcomes by allowing women to freely make reproductive choices that
are most suitable for their situation.282
Ridding laws of desexualization and ritualization will require major
changes in how we view women and reproduction on political, legal, medical,
and societal levels. That will be neither easy nor immediate. Until then, by
examining law and policy for the presence of ritualization and desexualization,
one can determine (1) what is the true goal of a law passed; (2) the potential
that the control over the woman exerted in the law or policy could be exported
to or co-opted by other areas of law; and (3) whether that potential is worth the
risk given the importance of a health-related goal.

Conclusion
Desire motivates consensual sex. It motivates every action related to
pregnancy, be it to have sex, to prevent pregnancy, to bring pregnancy about,
or to control its progress and end. There can be no child without a woman. This
fact makes women simultaneously the most powerful and the most vulnerable
individuals subject to State regulation. We cannot escape the fact that women
are essentialized by society and by the law specifically: they are pushed to act
like mothers regardless of whether they have children.283
Society focuses myopically on abortion as the defining concern in
women’s health.284 By looking at abortion, contraception, and birth-related
care, we see that desexualization and ritualization underlie State attempts to
control women’s reproductive autonomy in a variety of contexts and that
“health” is increasingly used as a political tool instead of a medical end.

for births resulting from unintended pregnancies nationwide were $11.1 billion). See generally Jeffrey T.
Jensen and Leon Speroff, Health Benefits of Oral Contraceptives, 27 Obstetetrics & Gynecology Clinics N.
Am. 705 (2000) (detailing specific health benefits of particular contraceptives).
282. See, e.g., Home Birth Complications ‘Less Common’ Than Hospital, BBC News (June 13, 2012),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/health-22888411.
283. Reilly, supra note 28, at 157–58.
284. Paltrow, supra note 16.

